Al-Saleh explained that international geopolitics have been the compelling forces behind the desire of world governments to achieve sovereignty of their space systems. “There are tensions and races to figure out who can control communications and who can have access to intelligence bifurcations of the world in different political systems,” Al-Saleh explained. “It’s becoming more and more challenging to figure out how do you become sovereign.”

Defense departments around the globe are currently facing significant, not seen before challenges due to the sophistication of kinetic and cyber-attack methods that could drastically impact the availability of their satellite networks. Al-Saleh pointed to the rise of complex cyberattacks as not only a threat to space sovereignty, but also a motivating factor for governments to attain sovereignty over their systems. “It’s harder to detect, and the nature of cybersecurity now is not just about prevention,” explained Al-Saleh. “It’s about how you react to them.”

Governments are now beginning to shift their focus on how they can protect their space assets and the critical data they transmit in a way that prioritizes sovereignty. For Al-Saleh, he views sovereignty in three distinct components.

The three types of sovereignty
The first is technology sovereignty, which – according to Al-Saleh – is rooted in the idea of having a proliferation of connectivity, communications, and networking paths. Sole reliance on a single technology stream can create an incredibly easy target for adversaries to take advantage of.

If a government or military’s primary source for comms or satellite connectivity is taken out through a cyber or jamming attack, it leaves them with no alternative source to fall back on in times of emergency. Having multiple sources and redundant streams for SATCOM can make an adversary’s target radius extremely small, making it more difficult for an attack to have a widespread effect.

The second component of true communication sovereignty, underlined by Al-Saleh, is operational sovereignty. This pertains to the idea that world governments and militaries should not be fully reliant on third parties to have a functional SATCOM architecture. “How do you make sure that you’re not dependent on somebody operating your infrastructure?” asked Al-Saleh. “You have to have control, to be able to access it, and to move from one contract to the other.”

The last dimension of Al-Saleh’s vision for sovereignty is rooted in data protection. Having assurance that a government’s data is secure, protected, and doesn’t get into the hands of adversaries is a driving force behind reaching a state of sovereignty over a nation’s space assets. “Ownership and control of all the data that you need, must be protected,” said Al-Saleh. “How do you do that in this fast-changing world?”

Partner to enable sovereignty and increase resiliency
Al-Saleh pointed to the PPP model as an important enabler to governments making their space sovereignty visions a reality. He cited numerous, successful collaborations between SES and governments as a sign that sovereignty is possible and within reach.

One partnership example that he highlighted was the collaboration between SES and the Luxembourg government which resulted in GovSat being established. Al-Saleh said, “GovSat is a secure SATCOM capability that is entirely dedicated to governments and institutions. We have a satellite and secure mission operations centre delivering a dedicated service using military bands. We also have dedicated gateways and terminals.”

He underlined that this blueprint can be replicated amongst other ally governments and militaries across the globe. “It’s set up so that the satellite connectivity solutions can be shared with other nations,” said Al-Saleh. “This particular solution can be accessed by NATO and Allied nations.”

MEO Global Services (MGS) is another example that Al-Saleh cited as a successful use case enabling space sovereignty. Through MGS, Luxembourg, the United States and NATO will be able to access SES’s latest SATCOM technology O3b mPOWER for defense and security and disaster recovery. “We’re able to offer services that are of the latest technology, jam-resistant, and feature flexibility and scalability. It is a revolutionary setup .”

To make partnerships work, Al-Saleh explained there are some key enablers that must be part of the process. “One is leveraging existing infrastructure,” said Al-Saleh. “There is a tendency to wish to build something new and something dedicated. And with the examples that I just used, there are highly efficient ways to leverage existing infrastructure and deliver the sovereign solution where the government customer has full control.”

It’s also important to make sure security requirements of the participating governments are met and that roles of each party involved – whether private or government sector – are clearly defined.

“When private sector brings innovation, and government supports it with investment, we create something that’s usable for governments and for commercial purposes across the world,” he said.

Finally, speed of execution is key. Faced with the geopolitical realities of today, Al-Saleh said that parties have to move faster to come up with the right solution. “As an industry where paradigms of satellite manufacturing and operations are constantly evolving, we must all embrace these disruptions to propose the right solution for governments. And together, we have to move fast, to stay ahead of disruption.”

The post SES CEO on Achieving Sovereign Systems Quickly appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

It’s not unusual for the NDAA to feature a number of different directives and requests for the DoD and the disparate military services. They may be asked to research ways to increase readiness. Or they may be directed to identify new ways to deliver mental or physical wellness services to enlisted service members.

But this year’s NDAA had a very specific and somewhat unusual request related to satellite communications:

“Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of the Defense Agencies, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on current commercial satellite communication initiatives, including with respect to new non-geostationary orbit satellite technologies that the Department of Defense has employed to increase satellite communication throughput to existing platforms of the military departments currently constrained by legacy capabilities.”

What are non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) commercial satellite services? They’re effectively any satellite communications service that are delivered via a satellite constellation that exists in an orbit closer to the Earth than geostationary orbit (GEO). And why is Congress so interested in NGSO satellite communications and its use by the DoD? There are a few good reasons for that.

The case for NGSO satellite
To truly oversimplify the operation of satellite networks, satellite communications function by a signal being sent into space, where it’s relayed by a satellite in orbit back to a physical location on Earth. The further the satellite is from Earth, the further that signal needs to travel – both in its initial journey to the satellite, and then in its return journey back to the Earth. The time that it takes to complete that journey is experienced by users as latency.

“Assurance is important when tools like satellite connectivity are mission-critical. The military needs to understand the risk that their satellite services face both on Earth and in space, and choose the solutions that will be available when they need them.”

By putting satellites in orbits closer to the Earth than GEO, commercial satellite providers have dramatically reduced the latency of satellite communications. When coupled with the next generation of high throughput satellite technologies, these satellites closer to Earth are capable of delivering incredibly high throughputs with incredibly low latency. This effectively results in a user experience not unlike a terrestrial fiberoptic network. But, unlike terrestrial networks, these NGSO satellite solutions are available practically anywhere on Earth – even in the most austere and geographically isolated of locations.

With the potential to deliver fiber-like connectivity to anywhere – from a military forward operating base in the middle of the desert, to a naval vessel afloat in the middle of the Pacific – it’s easy to see why Congress would be interested in the DoD investing in NGSO commercial satellite services. The use cases are almost limitless – ranging from traditional military operations, like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), to the downright futurist, like delivering telemedicine services via video teleconference.

But “NGSO” is a relatively broad term that includes a number of different satellite constellations in orbits outside of GEO. There is a veritable alphabet soup of other orbits, including Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) where commercial SATCOM providers are operating constellations. As a result, there are a number of disparate satellite operators to choose from, and a wide variety of services to choose between.

Which NGSO satellite solution is the right one?
While NGSO satellite can deliver the connectivity that the military needs in an age where practically every platform and weapons system is network and software-enabled, there could be some confusion as to which NGSO satellite service meets the needs of the DoD. And that choice will only get harder, as a number of new satellite services are set to launch in the next half-decade.

Here are three considerations that DoD decision-makers should keep in mind as they evaluate NGSO satellite services and solutions to ensure they get one that will meet mission requirements:

Is it secure?
When Internet and other critical communications services were denied at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a LEO satellite solution was rapidly made available to restore communications. Seemingly within hours, that LEO satellite service was degraded and denied, once again leaving the people of Ukraine without access to critical comms.

The provider of those services was heralded for its ability to quickly push updates to terminals and get that satellite service back online. But is that really what the military wants and needs?

As we discussed, today’s weapons systems and platforms work best when network enabled. The advanced AR, IoT, and other technology systems that the DoD is investing in for use on the battlefield are ultimately useless if they’re not connected. If today’s warfighters are trained on these systems, and are more effective with these capabilities, the military can’t have them denied – even if only temporarily.

“With the potential to deliver fiber-like connectivity to anywhere – from a military forward operating base in the middle of the desert, to a naval vessel afloat in the middle of the Pacific – it’s easy to see why Congress would be interested in the DoD investing in NGSO commercial satellite services.”

With the security of satellite communications so essential, the military should be looking for NGSO satellite solutions that have been cyber-hardened against the most pressing threats identified by the Office of Director of National Intelligence Space Threat Assessment. They should be looking for solutions that complicate an adversary’s targeting calculus by having no permanent paired linkage between U/L and D/L frequencies and polarities.

They should be looking for solutions that can quickly and easily adjust should attempts be made to jam or deny satellite service. For example, can a satellite solution rapidly adjust frequencies, polarities, power levels, bandwidth, handover timing, and beam location to avoid interference? And is there a GEO system available that can provide wide-area satellite capacity should the NGSO solution be denied?

Is it assured?
Not all of the threats to satellites are cyber and jamming threats. Sometimes there are threats to satellite communications that originate in orbit with the satellites. This includes the threat of interference and collision with other satellites in their orbit.

While GEO has traditionally been the home to most of the communications satellites in use throughout history, LEO is not exactly greenfield real estate. As of September 2021, there were 7,500 satellites in LEO. Compare that to the more than 550 satellites in GEO, and the approximately 140 satellites in MEO. Suddenly that orbit starts to sound incredibly congested. And that’s only going to get worse.

As smallsats and cubesats continue to become less expensive to purchase, and cheaper to launch, the number of them in LEO will increase exponentially. LEO is also considered by many to be the forerunner for the next generation of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites.

But, most importantly, since LEO satellites have an incredibly small Earth view, many satellites are needed in a LEO constellation to blanket the Earth in coverage. With numerous companies in a race to build LEO constellations with global coverage, LEO could see the addition of hundreds of new communications satellites in orbit just in the next few years.

Assurance is important when tools like satellite connectivity are mission-critical. The military needs to understand the risk that their satellite services face both on Earth and in space, and choose the solutions that will be available when they need them.

How much throughput is needed?
Satellite communications from GEO will play a role for the military into the future. It’s the most effective solution for covering a broad area in connectivity. NGSO satellite solutions will most likely play a more specialized role – providing incredibly high throughputs with miniscule latency for bandwidth-hungry modern IT solutions in the field.

“The advanced AR, IoT and other technology systems that the DoD is investing in for use in the battlefield are ultimately useless if they’re not connected. If today’s warfighters are trained on these systems, and are more effective with these capabilities, the military can’t have them denied – even if only temporarily.”

If the military needs to stream multiple, HD-quality ISR video streams from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or F-35s back to the military decision-makers that need the intelligence to make informed decisions, NGSO satellite is essential. Suppose the military wants to enable fiber-like connectivity for telehealth, or morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) capabilities onboard a Naval vessel in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. In that case, NGSO satellite is the correct choice.

But different NGSO satellite solutions offer different levels of capacity and bandwidth. If a large amount of bandwidth is needed, the DoD should be looking for a solution that can deliver multiple GBPS to each individual terminal – which should be more than enough capacity for even the most bandwidth-hungry of applications.

Considering the importance of fiber-like connectivity for the next generation of military platforms and weapons systems, it’s easy to understand why Congress specifically asked for a report on the military’s use of NGSO commercial satellite services in the most recent NDAA. But, if the DoD is going to begin to increase its reliance on NGSO solutions, it needs to ensure it’s choosing the right offering for its requirements. Security, assurance, and throughputs are just three of the many considerations they should keep in mind when evaluating solutions, but they’re quite possibly three of the most essential.

To learn more about how NGSO satellite services from MEO can deliver advanced capabilities to the warfighter, click HERE to download a complimentary copy of the whitepaper, “A New Era of Connectivity.”

Featured image: U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Cameron J. Rider establishes satellite communication with the combat operations center. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Pfc. Ulises Salgado). The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

The post 3 Considerations for Choosing the Best NGSO Satellite Solution appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

Since the Viasat attack, commercial satellite operators across the globe have been on high alert for potential cyberattacks and breaches that could potentially compromise or disable their critical systems. In fact, the Viasat attack led President Biden to issue an official statement imploring the commercial industry to prepare for what may come next.

“Most of America’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector and critical infrastructure owners and operators must accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” read the President’s statement. “If you have not already done so, I urge our private sector partners to harden your cyber defenses immediately.”

During last month’s SATELLITE 2022 conference, the Viasat incident was top-of-mind as conversations about the attack buzzed throughout the halls and session rooms of the Walter E. Washington Convention Center.

In one SATELLITE session entitled, “Securing Commercial Systems for Government Use,” the Viasat cyberattack set the table for the panel discussion, as experts from SES Space and Defense, Inmarsat Government, Eutelsat, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the U.S. Army examined how both the U.S. government and the commercial satellite industry can work together to bolster the security of our nation’s commercial systems in space.

Here are a couple key takeaways on securing commercial satellite systems from the adversary and assuring the resiliency of satellite services and connectivity for the future battlefield:

GEO, MEO, LEO…and switching in between

It is imperative that the U.S. military have access to the satellite technologies and services that facilitate assured communications for the warfighter. But just as important as providing those services is the security, resiliency, and speed of those critical systems.

The importance of high-throughput and low latency satellite services provided by Medium-Earth Orbit (MEO) and Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites was a major discussion point during the session. U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Robert Collins shared with the panel that the Army’s focus on its next capability set will be expanding its capacity for MEO and LEO connectivity at the edge, pointing to the orbits’ proven track records on delivering high-throughput, low latency connectivity.

He continued to say how PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingent, and Emergency) communications plans on-orbit could also strengthen resiliency of critical space systems. “I think this SATCOM layer just adds an additional ability for us to do that,” said Maj. Gen. Collins. “We want to leverage it…This is certainly something that we can tap into, and really thickens our communications structure.”

Pete Hoene, President and CEO of SES Space and Defense, also agreed that connectivity provided by MEO satellites will provide the warfighter with high-speed connection that they require on the ground. Referring to the SES O3b MEO satellite service, Hoene explained that it can deliver, “fiber-like latency that is very high-throughput,” and that the next-generation constellation – O3b mPOWER – will build upon those capabilities even further.

Though the latency and throughput provided by MEO satellites solves the issue for warfighters on the ground, they do not necessarily solve security issues on-orbit. But in a recent, successful test by SES and Hughes, the satellite providers were able to demonstrate their ability to switch signals across satellites in Geostationary (GEO) and MEO.

This new signal-switching capability solves a massive amount of on-orbit security issues. By being able to switch signals across orbits, the U.S. can assure the resiliency and security of the satellite systems and services that are available to the military.

Deploying a rapid beam switching capability on an integrated COMSATCOM and MILSATCOM architecture can enable the U.S. military to seamlessly roll-over applications and systems to other satellites inter- or intra-orbit, stopping adversaries in their tracks if they attempt to jam or execute kinetic attacks on commercial satellites leveraged by the U.S. government.

Agile Acquisition

Another key takeaway from the session was the important role agile acquisition of satellite capabilities and services play in securing commercial space assets that the military utilizes. Implementing an agile framework would facilitate faster military adoption of commercial capabilities that are modified and tailored specifically for the warfighter.

According to Maj. Gen. Collins, implementing an agile acquisition framework will allow the military to adopt new commercial capabilities quicker, enabling operators to be ahead of the adversary, which in turn would make space systems more secure. “We can bring in these technologies faster, and we can keep pace with the threat,” said Maj. Gen. Collins.

For Hoene, stronger partnerships between industry and the U.S. government procurement agencies are needed in order for the commercial industry to properly invest in the new capabilities that the U.S. government wants and needs.

To learn more about the recent cross-orbit signal test by SES and Hughes, click HERE.

The post Securing commercial satellites against growing adversarial threats appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

To say that the future of the U.S. military is more software-enabled, and more network-enabled than ever before would be a massive understatement. Everything that the military is developing and piloting for use in battle today needs connectivity.

Just look at the Army’s IVAS program, which is working to deliver an advanced augmented reality (AR) solution to the warfighter on the battlefield – putting important information, situational awareness capabilities, and other tools directly in their field of vision via a HoloLens headset.

According to Steve Kitay, the Senior Director of Azure Space at Microsoft, the IVAS headset will be augmented by Azure cloud services, and function to, “[keep] soldiers safer and [make] them more effective…[by] delivering enhanced situational awareness, enabling information sharing, and decision making for a variety of scenarios.”

And while this is certainly an exciting and revolutionary new tool in the warfighter’s kit, it’s only possible with connectivity in theater.

If everything that the warfighter relies on in theater is going to become network-enabled, then connectivity needs to be assured. Training a soldier to rely on a tool that only works when connected would be setting them up for failure if the network that supports the tool can be degraded or denied. Resilient, assured networks are no longer “nice to have,” they’re mission-critical.

While that looks good on paper, assured networks are easier to discuss – or write about – than they are to implement in the real world.

Complexity and a lack of transparency impact uptime
The terrestrial networks that provide the backbone of our high-bandwidth connectivity at home are incredibly stable and reliable, with SLAs and uptimes that ensure that connectivity is almost always available. Unfortunately, those terrestrial networks, themselves, are often unavailable where the military and government operates.

In foreign countries and isolated geographic locations, terrestrial networks may not exist at all. If that infrastructure does exist, it could be unreliable, or it could be untrusted. But that’s not just a problem that the military faces abroad. There are large swaths of our own country with no high-bandwidth terrestrial networks due to cost, geography, or other reasons.

In these places, satellite connectivity is essential and necessary to deliver the high-bandwidth, high-throughput, low-latency connectivity necessary for the government and military to operate their next-generation, network-enabled platforms, devices, and vehicles.

“…Hydra includes an inventory management system that integrates shared and dedicated devices, circuits, and the space segment into the same contextual environment…[allowing users] to schedule and monitor the entire end-to-end network in a single, integrated pane of glass, diagnose problems more rapidly, and fix problems before they take applications, services, and capabilities offline.” – Amit Katti

But adding satellite communications to the network infrastructure for government agencies and the military effectively increases the complexity of the networks – giving them a network architecture that incorporates assets on Earth, and in space. Much like with a modern car that’s more of a computer than an automobile, this increased complexity can also mean that there are more things that can fail or more things that can go wrong.

Worse, the military is utilizing a number of disparate terrestrial networks, disparate terrestrial hardware, and utilizing space assets and networks that include their own military assets, as well as commercial assets. This creates a lack of transparency and visibility into everything that’s happening across the network – a problem that the military is actively working to fix by embracing a joint operating environment across all of the DoD’s branches and organizations.

For the government and military to ensure connectivity and have assured networks, they need the ability to see the entire network – both terrestrial assets and space assets – on a single pane of glass. If a single, unified view of the network and the individual devices connected to it were available, the government and military would be able to diagnose problems more rapidly, and fix problems before they take applications, services, and capabilities offline.

Luckily, such a solution now exists.

Increasing transparency and uptime with Hydra
Earlier this week, commercial satellite operator, SES Space and Defense launched a new common operational picture (COP) platform called Hydra that the company claims, “…provides end-to-end situational awareness in a single unified operational network platform.”

Hydra was built in-house by SES Space and Defense specifically for their government and military customers. The solution integrates network data from multiple different sources – including operational data from the company’s satellite networks – and enables users to display it on a single dashboard or pane of glass. This could effectively enable the government and military the opportunity to view everything happening on and within their networks in one place – increasing transparency and allowing them to identify and remediate problems with the network more quickly.

“In addition to providing basic M&C data, Hydra includes an inventory management system that integrates shared and dedicated devices, circuits, and the space segment into the same contextual environment,“ explained Amit Katti, a Principal Engineer at SES Space and Defense. “This ability to incorporate and visualize the entire network allows the customer to schedule and monitor the entire end-to-end network in a single, integrated pane of glass, diagnose problems more rapidly, and fix problems before they take applications, services, and capabilities offline.”

COP platforms, such as Hydra, could be revolutionary in enabling the military to better monitor their networks – both on Earth and in space – and identify problems before they bring down networks. With network-enabled and software-enabled devices, applications, and platforms making their way into every government and military mission and operation, the timing couldn’t be better.

Networks aren’t “nice to have” at the tactical edge anymore. They’re essential. COP platforms like Hydra are ensuring that these networks are always on and available to the warfighter. This way, the next-generation, high-tech tools that our government and military personnel rely on are there when and where they need them – even in the most remote and austere of environments.

In our next article on the Government Satellite Report, we’ll look at the military’s push for an integrated commercial and military satellite architecture, and how COP platforms like Hydra could help make that a reality.

To learn more about the new Hydra common operational picture platform, click HERE.

The post Hydra – delivering more resilient networks to a more network-enabled military appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

But when it comes to the United States’ place in near-peer competitions, where exactly does the global superpower fall on the spectrum?

At last month’s Space Innovation Summit 2021, David Hamilton, the Founder and CEO of America’s Future Series, and Nicolas Chaillan, the former – but first-ever – Chief Software Officer (CSO) of the U.S. Air Force and Space Force, held a fireside chat focused on the topic of near-peer competition.

The session and discussion primarily revolved around Chaillan, who recently stepped down from his position last September, and his experiences as CSO. During the session, Chaillan shared his thoughts on the United States’ role as a global competitor and the changes he believes the U.S. government needs to make in order to remain a dominant force on the world stage.

Chaillan had many wins at the Department of Defense (DoD), which included nudging the Department towards modern IT and cybersecurity infrastructures and demonstrating that the DoD could put an advanced cyber stack with zero trust architecture and baked-in security on legacy hardware.

But, as great as Chaillan’s wins were for the Department, he couldn’t shake the startling realizations he was having as CSO. “We proved again and again that all this is possible,” said Chaillan. “It is possible to move at a pace of relevance in the U.S. government. Unfortunately, what we were not seeing is a sense of urgency, particularly when it comes to China.”

According to Chaillan, the term “near-peer adversary” should not be applied in any discussion pertaining to China. “We like to call them the near-peer adversary, but I completely disagree with that,” explained Chaillan. “I would argue that they’re leading actually in cybersecurity, and also in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) adoption.”

Chaillan pointed to strict mandates placed on enterprise and industry technologies by the Chinese government as the primary catalyst of China surpassing the U.S. in these areas. But, in the end, Chaillan ultimately places most of the blame on the U.S. government for China’s lead.

“We see the U.S. government becoming complacent and getting used to China catching up,” said Chaillian. “We should be leading so far with the amount of money we’re spending…We probably get a 10 cent ROI on the dollar.”

Chaillan also directed sharp criticism towards the DoD’s current reliance on waterfall IT approaches, its slow-drip pace on agile adoption, the Department’s “nightmare of an acquisition process,” as well as “siloes and egos,” all of which he believes is crippling the U.S. from becoming a credible competitor on the world stage.

According to Chaillan, all of the U.S. government’s pitfalls equate to a “very poor return on investment ratio, which leads to China catching up.”

To illustrate his vision of how he’d like the U.S. government to position itself in terms of being a global competitor, he used Tesla as an example.

“Tesla is completely fine open-sourcing their patents, because they’re moving so fast that they know by the time their competitors even remotely catch up, they’re going to be five miles ahead.” He explained that the U.S. should “be exactly in that role.”

Chaillan believes that the U.S. is in a bit of denial when it pertains to its attitude of where the country falls on the competitive spectrum. “We need to stop telling ourselves that we’re way ahead and someday they’ll catch us.”

Chaillan also explained that China is targeting to be the world leader in AI by 2030, and that the country is already far ahead of where our current capabilities stand. And even though the 2030 date may make it seem like the U.S. has time to catch up, Chaillan revealed a startling fact about China’s dominance in the AI arena. A fact that he believes should be a wake-up call for the U.S. government.

Due to the nature of AI technology and how it advances and evolves, “You get to a point where you won’t be able to catch up,” explained Chailllan. “So, we estimate December of 2022 to be the deadline by which if the U.S. government does not wake up, we will not have an ability to catch up. And that means a real existential threat for our kids and the nation.”

Despite Chaillan’s bleak outlook, he does believe there are solutions that can help change the U.S. government’s course for the better.

He believes that the concept of agility is key. “The whole concept of agile is the continuous, small, and incremental delivery of value in production in a tangible way used by the actual end-user warfighter,” explained Chaillan.

Chaillan explained that the U.S. government needs to improve on training leaders and warfighters on agile. He also believes that training to needs to happen much earlier during the on-boarding process. Chaillan also believes that mandating DevSecOps approaches to new programs would be a huge step forward for the DoD. He also pointed to further empowerment of current and future workforces, by investing in continuous learning and being on top of breaking IT and cybersecurity trends.

Space and satellite innovation

China taking the lead in AI and ML innovation should be a wake-up call to our country – an example of how complacency can result in us losing our leadership position in other areas. The space domain would be one area where America has always led in innovation and capability, but could soon find their leadership in question.

The U.S. military has always relied on space capabilities to enable warfighters in the field. Our near-peer adversaries have seen the success and strategic edge that space and satellites technologies have given the U.S. in the past, and they want to emulate it. Though the U.S. has remained extremely competitive in space, it is anticipated that that edge could quickly evaporate.

One way that the U.S. can maintain its lead ahead of near-peer competitors is to turn to the innovations and solutions the commercial satellite industry can provide. Today’s commercial satellite industry is the clear innovator in the space domain, and the military should be looking to leverage their solutions whenever possible, instead of building their own.

Building and launching the satellites that the commercial satellite industry is launching today could take the U.S. military half a decade or more, depending on how smoothly the appropriation and acquisition processes run. Instead of the U.S. government building and launching its own purpose-built satellites and having them operational in five year’s time, it could partner with the commercial satellite companies whose technologies and services are immediately available, can be tailored to specific mission needs, and are priced at a fraction of the cost of building an entire satellite.

The concern about the U.S. losing its competitive and innovative edge extends well beyond AI, cybersecurity, and machine learning. In fact, it’s a problem that extends all the way into space. Partnering closely with industry, the true innovators in space, instead of trying to emulate what industry partners are doing today could save years of time and money for the U.S. government, and help the country maintain its competitive edge in space.

The post Near-peer no more? Is complacency costing the country its innovative edge? appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

On Wednesday, September 8, SATELLITE held the “Satellite Cybersecurity” session, where SES Space and Defense’s Vice President of Corporate Development, Todd Gossett, moderated a panel discussion that included:

• Rebecca Cowen-Hirsch, Senior Vice President, Government Strategy & Policy U.S. Government Business Unit, Inmarsat, Inc.
• Dianne Poster, Senior Advisor, National Institute of Standards and Technology
• Jared Reece, Program Analyst, COMSATCOM Solutions Branch, U.S. Space Force

Today’s warfighters rely on space like they’ve never had before. Through advancements in satellite technology, the infrastructure of the U.S. military is now provided with critical warfighting capabilities that were not available in the past. But with each new advancement over the past few decades, these capabilities are now integrated so deeply into critical warfighting functions, it’s incumbent upon satellite providers, and the agencies that procure them, to ensure that those capabilities are available, when and where those warfighters need them.

One of the greatest and ever-growing threats to providing these capabilities to the military is today’s cyber threat landscape. As the attacks from nation-state hackers and other malicious actors become increasingly sophisticated, the potential for mission-critical IT capabilities or applications to be comprised or denied has risen. When capabilities and functions provided by satellites are interrupted, warfighters can lose communication and situational awareness, military operations can fail, and in worst case scenarios, American lives could be lost.

According to Gossett, “Both industry and government have taken a hard look at this over the past several years. And we are taking actions collectively to address this landscape that we’re now deployed in.”

Reece pointed out that, “With the transition away from strictly MILSATCOM to bringing in more commercial SATCOM, this is becoming a more impactful topic to the warfighter.” Though the innovation from industry is imperative for the success of today’s military, commercial systems and equipment must go through thorough evaluations and inspection to ensure that they have best-of-breed cybersecurity posture.

To combat these risks and threats, federal government agencies, the military, and industry are coming together to ensure that space systems, and the satellites they run on, have gone through rigorous cybersecurity evaluation and testing in order to prevent cybersecurity attacks.

Within the last few years, the White House, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the U.S. Space Force, and other federal agencies, have released directives and guidance specifically focusing on bolstering the cybersecurity posture requirements of current space systems and satellites, while simultaneously doing the same for new systems that are being brought into the market.

As space systems innovate and evolve in the future, cybersecurity threats will undoubtedly keep pace in their sophistication and boldness. It is imperative that new systems brought in from the commercial market have the highest level of cybersecurity possible. When these criteria are met, the federal government and military can rest assured knowing they are deploying space systems and satellites that were designed with the utmost innovation and security in mind.

One of these cybersecurity directives is the Space Policy Directive – 5 (SPD-5), which was released by the White House last year. SPD-5 serves as the nation’s first comprehensive cybersecurity policy for space systems. SPD-5 establishes key cybersecurity principles to guide and serve as the foundation for America’s approach to the cyber protection of space systems.

According to the directive, “It is essential to protect space systems from cyber incidents in order to prevent disruptions to their ability to provide reliable and efficient contributions to the operations of the nation’s critical infrastructure.”

Reece praised the directive by saying, “I was actually really excited to see this come out, because one of the things that our office has been doing for years is that integration that SPD-5 is asking for.”

Cowen-Hirsch echoed Reece’s sentiment by adding, “I think what SPD-5 has done is really elevate the focus of space as well.” She acknowledged that there have been many directives about systems cybersecurity, but she explained, “These have been largely focused on information systems, but not necessarily space. So that intersection between space and cyberspace and the threat vectors that we’re seeing, and the reality that the satellite is yet another node on those networks, is very significant.”

On the NIST side of the conversation, Poster explained, “At NIST, we do take SPD-5 as sort of a fundamental core basis of policy development for where we’re focusing cybersecurity efforts for not only satellites, but space systems.”

Not only does SPD-5 lay the groundwork for satellite cybersecurity policy, but it also underscores the importance of fostering “practices within U.S. government and commercial space operations that protect space assets and their supporting infrastructure from cyber threats.”

Luckily, many COMSATCOM providers are already meeting – or exceeding – the cybersecurity guidance in SPD-5. For example, SES is already ahead of the curve when it comes to implementing the recommendations in SPD-5. Gossett highlighted the fact that SES’s highly anticipated medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellite constellation, O3b mPOWER, is fully compliant with SPD-5. Gossett said, “We’ve spent significant time and effort trying to build in cybersecurity from a lifecycle approach into our latest satellite system, mPOWER…This is something that we bake in.”

The introduction of SPD-5 could ultimately provide two positives for the U.S. government and military. The creation of the guidance has established a baseline of security for commercial satellite services and solutions that can assuage any existing governmental concerns or fears about the security of satellite solutions. Seeing that a satellite service or solution meets the recommendations in the guidance ensures that the vendor puts a high priority on security and mission assurance.

This peace of mind is what will drive the second benefit – opening the door for government and military organizations to benefit from the innovation and cost-savings that comes from utilizing commercial satellite services. It’s widely acknowledged across the government that commercial industry is now the leader in space innovation. By eliminating a barrier that may have kept some government and military organizations from eschewing COMSATCOM services for purpose-built satellites, SPD-5 is making that innovation available for these organizations at a fraction of the capital expense.

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As in previous years, this year’s AFCEA West brought together senior military decision makers and private industry leaders to talk about their largest technology and communications challenges and discuss the latest innovations and technology trends that can help the military accomplish its missions. Also, much like in previous years, this year’s AFCEA West was heavily attended by the U.S. Navy, with a large focus on the USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility (AoR) – which makes sense considering the event’s physical location.

What was different – and rather surprising – about this year’s event was the overarching topics of discussion. Unlike in years past, fewer of the discussions that I had with military leaders focused on the logistical and geographic challenges that the USINDOPACOM AoR poses to the Navy – a topic that has been covered extensively on the Government Satellite Report by some of my associates. Instead, they talked extensively about two different topics – the requirements being put on the Navy due to cloud initiatives and implementations and the cybersecurity concerns facing military communications.

Let’s take a look at each of those things individually, and then talk about some of the ways that we feel satellite can help.

Navy looks to go “cloud first”
The scalability, flexibility and cost savings that often result from cloud implementations have driven many top-down “cloud first” initiatives across the federal government. Until recently, a myriad of concerns and challenges – including security concerns – had put the Department of Defense (DoD) and military entities behind many civilian federal agencies in cloud adoption.

However, following the recent release of the DoD Cloud Strategy, the military has accelerated their movement to the cloud. This was reinforced during AFCEA West by Rear Admiral Danelle Barrett, who gave a presentation on how the Navy Cyber Security Division (N2N6G) has been running pilot programs to identify how to best utilize the cloud.

With military systems and applications moving to the cloud, the need for connectivity at the edge increases dramatically. Also, since all data and applications will be hosted in the cloud and some of those files will be very large, the connections available to the warfighter need to offer high bandwidth and low latency to ensure operations on par with terrestrial networks.

Also, with mission-critical applications and information being accessed via the cloud, the need for assured communications and secure communications becomes increasingly important.

The need for mission assurance and security
The military increasingly relies on network-connected devices, platforms and vehicles in-theater, network connectivity becomes essential to the mission. As Rear Adm. Boris Becker, Commander of the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, said during a panel discussion at AFCEA West, “It’s information in warfare and information as warfare.”

Regardless of where the warfighter is operating, connectivity needs high availability and also needs to be resilient against attack.

Our enemies understand the advantage that our military gains through IT systems and applications. They also know the role that satellite plays in enabling those IT systems and applications. It behooves our adversaries to aggressively work to deny satellite capabilities to our warfighters.

As Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. Robert Neller, responded during a session at AFCEA West, “We’re at war right now in cyberspace. We’ve been at war for maybe a decade.”

Unfortunately, our increasingly sophisticated adversaries – especially those in the USINDOPACOM AoR – are becoming extremely capable and adept at denying satellite connectivity. Our adversaries – especially China and Russia – have shown that they are capable of denying satellite connectivity a number of ways. From direct kinetic attacks on satellites themselves, to simply jamming satellite signals, satellite connections are becoming more susceptible to attack at a time when they’re becoming more important than ever.

Luckily, commercial satellite solutions that are available today could help the military overcome their bandwidth, latency and mission assurance issues.

MEO delivers secure high-throughput connectivity
As we’ve established, the military is going all in on bandwidth-hogging applications and systems in the cloud, and network-enabling many of their devices and platforms. Coupled with their cloud initiatives, this is driving massive need for bandwidth at the edge.

Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellite constellations are capable of delivering that high-throughput, high-bandwidth connectivity. Utilizing satellites that are half the distance to the Earth than geostationary (GEO) satellites, MEO constellations bring fiber-like connectivity to the military without the usual latency that impacts GEO satellite services. This means that even cloud applications can operate in the field via satellite with the same level of responsiveness and performance as they would over terrestrial networks.

Then there’s the issue of security and mission assurance. With missions increasingly relying on network-enabled devices, applications and platforms, mission success is increasingly tied to network availability. This is also an area where commercially-operated MEO satellite constellations can help.

It’s well established that distributing military communications through commercial satellite networks can help increase mission assurance by simply making it harder to find and negate the satellite carrying them. But, MEO satellites come with additional mission assurance capabilities baked-in.

To jam satellite signals, an adversary has to physically be located within the satellite beam. The spot beams being utilized by HTS MEO satellites are physically smaller, forcing any would-be satellite jammer to be uncomfortably close to opposing military forces. The very nature of the steerable spotbeams on MEO satellites also makes it possible to direct additional beams or replacement beams to fill in for ones that have been denied or compromised.

If AFCEA West showed us anything, it’s that the Navy – as well as the rest of the military – is doubling down on network-centric operations and increasingly moving into the cloud. While this will ultimately unlock incredible capabilities and benefits to the warfighter, it also creates connectivity and security challenges. However, by partnering with industry and utilizing the advanced satellite services available to them – including today’s MEO satellite constellations – the DoD can overcome these challenges and ensure that the warfighter always has access to what they need.

To learn more about the potential benefits of MEO at the edge, download the whitepaper, “High Throughput on the High Seas.”

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During the first part of our discussion, we defined and explained CNSSP-12 and discussed how it has evolved and changed as it’s been reevaluated and refreshed over time to keep up with shifting threats. We also looked at how the policy has helped commercial satellite communications providers service the military more securely.

In part two of our discussion, Andrew shares his predictions for what the next iteration of CNSSP-12 will look like, discusses how it will impact the industry, and provides insights into how CNSSP-12 can shape space policy across the military in the very near future, thanks to the ongoing Wideband Satellite Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) being conducted by the Air Force.

Here is what Andrew had to say:

Government Satellite Report (GSR): The updated CNSSP-12 hasn’t been released yet, but can you tell us what changes you’re anticipating for commercial providers when the new, updated policy is revealed?

Andrew D’Uva: When the policy is released, I anticipate that we’ll see an increased focus from the government on verifying the security posture of these commercial solutions.

In the past, industry designed their systems and then – if they were going to play in the government and military market – they would go back and try to implement U.S. Government security requirements at a later stage. Now, they’re working to incorporate these things into these satellite systems at design time and maintain them throughout the system lifecycle. This shows industry is starting to think about security up front.

I anticipate that the new CNSSP-12 guidance will take advantage of that new attitude and incorporate much more information sharing between industry and government. This will ensure that the government is aware and informed about the steps that industry is taking to make their solutions reliable, robust, and secure.

This will lead government to require more security assurance systems in place for commercial satellite solutions, and more auditing. What I expect to see is much more focus on formalizing processes, taking a quality management approach, documenting things and making security part of the daily activities of managing these systems.

GSR: Will the CNSSP-12 refresh have any impact on the developing Wideband AoA and the USG’s ability to better harmonize commercial and military space architectures?

Andrew D’Uva: This is really an important question due to what is currently happening across the military in regard to satellite architectures. Up until now – in terms of SATCOM – the U.S. military has first relied on purpose-built satellites that they own and operate and looked to commercial meet excess demand. I’m talking about AEHF, WGS, and MUOS, which are used for different missions, including strategic nuclear command and control, tactical protected SATCOM, wideband SATCOM, and narrow-band, tactical SATCOM. All of those have performed well, and have their benefits and drawbacks.

Commercial wideband systems have been, until the recent introduction of managed services, largely transponded capacity where the Government’s focus was ensuring positive control of the commercial satellite bus, not necessarily the underlying communications services.

Looking forward, the government is trying to figure out if it makes sense to continue to use these siloes of purpose-built constellations and use commercial to fill in the rest, or, to what extent should commercial infrastructure solutions be part of meeting the baseline demand and integrated into an enduring architecture that spans both government and commercial capabilities.

Despite there being a two-decade track record of success in using commercial solutions securely, for the government to be really comfortable in advocating for an integrated architecture – which is supported by industry – they need to be confident in the level of security and mission assurance.

The security requirements like those in CNSSP-12, NIST cybersecurity framework and other cybersecurity guidance and policies will ensure that the SATCOM industry can continue to participate in an environment that is increasingly non-benign. The environment that we’re in and are moving into in the future is one in which our adversaries are seeking to do us harm through cyber effects. In this environment, the government needs to know that the security posture of wideband COMSATCOM systems is on par with purpose-built MILSATCOM systems.

I believe that many commercial systems are on par, but that’s not the perception of some military decision makers. I’ve had senior level defense decision makers tell me that MILSATCOM is held to a higher cybersecurity standard than COMSATCOM. However, COMSATCOM satellites are held to the same requirements contractually by DOD. A lot of government personnel don’t realize that – they think commercial is lesser than and not as secure as MILSATCOM. They don’t realize that COMSATCOM typically has secured locations, cleared personnel and high security standards. I’ve seen cases where once that’s understood, military leaders are willing to consider commercial solutions, including their unique benefits.

Since CNSSP-12 applies to both military and commercial satellites it should help military decision makers to adopt an enduring role in an integrated wideband SATCOM enterprise architecture for qualified COMSATCOM solutions.

Now, there are certain military SATCOM missions – such as nuclear command and control that are designed to work in a nuclear war environment – that requires a higher level of mission assurance than will ever be offered by commercial providers. Those special missions will always require costly, custom-built government satellites. But for most missions, COMSATCOM can fill that need if operators have implemented these security requirements. If some commercial offerors haven’t implemented them, those solutions may be fine for other commercial or government uses, but not for national security missions.

GSR: What does the COMSATCOM industry need from the military to make this a reality? How can the military incentivize the industry to incorporate CNSSP-12 requirements into their systems and service offerings?

Andrew D’Uva: The government needs to match its acquisition policy and practice to the policies that are levied. The government needs to move away from simply looking at the lowest priced solution as being the best solution. They first need to look at effectiveness and cyber security before looking at price. If there are participants in the acquisition process that don’t meet these security requirements, they need to be ruled out as not technically acceptable. Then the military can focus on competition among the multiple compliant suppliers.

That has not yet happened. There are many reasons, but they primarily have to do with the way that COMSATCOM typically has been funded. COMSATCOM is typically funded from Overseas Contingency Operations money, which is short-term money that is available to a Combatant Command and it’s not in the baseline DoD budget. Military purpose-built SATCOM programs, which are programs of record, don’t charge fees to the user when they’re utilized. This makes it seem that – from a user perspective – MILSATCOM is free while COMSATCOM costs money. The truth is that everything costs the taxpayer money.

So, it’s a function of how these budgeting processes work, and we need to fix that.

If you look at the FY18 NDAA, there is a section in there – Section 1601 – that assigns the Commander of Air Force Space Command as the DoD acquisition authority for COMSATCOM leases, in consultation with the DoD CIO. That is a major change and will be a very important one to watch in 2018.

For the very first time – when that change is done – the organization that builds the wideband SATCOM programs of record will be the same as the organization that has authority to lease COMSATCOM capacity.

In the past, DISA handled commercial leases and Space Command handled programs of record. The two sides never needed to make a budget or resource decision about how to best spend taxpayer dollars between those two acquisition approaches for SATCOM capabilities. But, a year from now, there will be one acquisition authority.

This will be the first time the DoD will be organizationally structured to make those decisions and spend the taxpayer’s money more effectively while still getting the resources and capabilities it needs. That also means that 2018 will be the first time that the government will be able to drive industry into participating in an integrated architecture. It’s a great opportunity for all of us to ensure the nation has the SATCOM capabilities it needs.

If you missed part one of our two-part conversation with Andrew D’Uva, click HERE to read it in its entirety.

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One of the military’s largest concerns today involves the space domain. Space is increasingly congested and our adversaries are becoming increasingly capable of compromising and attacking our satellites. With many military IT capabilities, applications and services traveling over satellites, cybersecurity is becoming increasingly essential.

One of the policies that the government has put in place to ensure the security of the satellites the military is utilizing in-theater is Committee on National Security Systems Policy 12 (CNSSP-12). That policy is currently being reevaluated and refreshed, and new standards and requirements are scheduled to be released shortly.

To learn more about CNSSP-12, its history and its impact on the satellite industry, we sat down with Andrew D’Uva, the President of Providence Access Co. and the U.S. Industry Liaison on the Commercial Space Infosec Working Group (CSIWG), which is giving the satellite industry a voice in the CNSSP-12 refresh process.

During the first part of a two-part interview with Andrew, we define CNSSP-12, explore how it’s evolved over time, and how it helps the Commercial Satellite Communication or COMSATCOM industry serve the federal government. Here is what Andrew had to say:

Government Satellite Report (GSR): What is the CNSSP-12? Why is a review and update currently being done? What is the status of the CNSSP-12 review/update right now?

Andrew D’Uva: The CNSSP-12 is effectively the CNSS policy number twelve. It’s a formal policy of the CNSS, which is the Committee on National Security Systems – a U.S. government interagency committee comprised of the DOD, National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI, the branches of the military, and other national security-focused government agencies and entities.

The CNSS puts out policies and implementation guidance on a variety of information security issues by developing operating policies, procedures, guidelines, directives, instructions and standards. Issues can range from the use of cryptography, secure modes of communications and other security challenges facing the nation.

CNSS Policy 12 is the evolution of an earlier set of policies designed to apply to the cybersecurity of space systems used to support national security missions.

This policy isn’t new, although it periodically gets updated. In the past, it applied to the U.S. government at large. However, about ten years ago, it was updated to clarify that its requirements would apply to foreign and commercial systems used to support national security missions. That was the first time that the government said, “Here is a set of government requirements that apply to COMSATCOM operators and solution providers serving national security missions.”

In the past, COMSATCOM providers wouldn’t have to worry about a policy like this – they would just provide a commercial solution to the government. But the new, updated policy implied a number of cyber security requirements needed to be added to these systems due to their critical role in national security missions.

The policy was updated as part of a normal review process that is supposed to occur every few years. That review process is occurring again right now, with a new update anticipated to be released in early 2018. These updates and reviews are necessary because threats change, and the government’s approach to vulnerabilities has to change and evolve with them.

GSR: You mentioned that CNSSP-12 has been updated and changed over time. What has changed and what new requirements have been added?

Andrew D’Uva: CNSSP-12 levied a requirement in the past stating COMSATCOM systems that served national security missions would have to use what is called NSA-approved cryptography and cryptosystems to protect the satellite command uplink between the ground and satellite. That meant that satellite operators had to design, equip, and operate their satellites using a system that had been reviewed and approved by the NSA on their spacecraft that would apply an approved cryptographic system implementation to secure the commands between the ground and the satellites.

NSA-approved solutions protect the confidentiality and integrity of the commands, preventing third parties from seeing or altering commands in transit to the satellite. This was a requirement that applied to government systems in the past, but the CNSSP-12 policy effectively extended it to commercial systems.

As a result, almost all communications satellite companies that want to do business with the military have worked this into their satellites. It costs them more money and there’s more security involved, but it’s been largely accepted by industry. It has largely been a policy success for the government.

The policy change and update in 2012 involved a new requirement for securing the telemetry – the information traveling from the satellite to the ground regarding its health, safety and monitoring.

The update called for similar NSA-approved systems to be used to protect that information in the downlink direction. That has been slower to be adopted by industry because of a lack of available systems. However, we’re starting to see that get worked into COMSATCOM systems that are used for national security missions.

GSR: How does the CNSSP-12 enable commercial operators to better serve government needs?

Andrew D’Uva: Ultimately, all of these policies and policy changes are all about reliability and robustness. The government wants to use COMSATCOM and commercial imagery, but they want to be sure that those solutions are of high quality and available when needed. CNSSP-12 improved that resilience posture and made them more robust.

A satellite with these solutions – in contrast to one without them – is less vulnerable to being impacted by adversaries. With space becoming an increasingly contested environment, and with our adversaries recognizing the advantage that the U.S. military gains from its satellite infrastructure, this is an increasingly realistic concern for today and into the future.

GSR: How are the commercial operators participating in the CNSSP-12 refresh effort? How has this matured over time?

Andrew D’Uva: Up until this last refresh cycle, the government was the sole driver of the refresh activities. However, in the last refresh cycle, the government – specifically the NSA and DISA – established a working group called the Commercial Space Infosec Working Group (CSIWG), which was open to U.S. industry and designed to look at information security issues, including policy issues.

I serve as the U.S. Industry Liaison, and I lead the CSIWG with two other leaders from the NSA and DISA, respectively, along with a steering committee of industry executives. The CSIWG meets a couple of times a year at various sites, and – through the efforts of the NSA – they work to inform industry about the policy review process and get industry comments.

Through the CSIWG, industry leaders have authored a series of inputs and comments for the government. These comments specifically addressed the current policy, the role of commercial providers, the applicability of CNSSP-12 to commercial systems, as well as some technical issues with downlink telemetry and transmission security and how it is applied. The NSA then took these comments and inputs into the process for consideration.

The government hasn’t shared this revised CNSSP-12 yet with industry, but there are indications that some of that input was taken into account and worked into this guidance.

In part two of our two-part Q&A interview with Andrew D’Uva, he shares his predictions for what will change in the refreshed CNSSP-12, discusses how it will impact space policy for the military, and talks about the impact of CNSSP-12 on the SATCOM industry.

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By: Mark Wiggins, Director of DoD Business Development, Juniper Networks

Late last month, AFCEA sponsored their annual Technet Asia Pacific Conference, which brings together private industry and leading technology companies with thought leaders and decision makers from the Federal Government and United States Military. It’s the largest event in the Asia Pacific region that focuses on the unique defense issues impacting the region.

I had the opportunity to attend this year’s event in Honolulu, HI, to listen to military leaders describe their challenges and technology requirements in the region, and to discuss these things directly with senior military decision makers. And there was one particular theme that resonated across the entire conference – the need to operate in a communications degraded environment.

When North Korea was first test launching missiles and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were winding down, the Asia PAC theater was the focus of significant military attention. However, that area seemed to be on the back burner in recent months, thanks in large part to the threat of ISIS and other issues in the Middle East.

However, the Asia PAC region remains a priority for the United States military – especially as tensions between NATO and Russia rise, North Korea continues missile testing, and China continues to rapidly construct new islands in the South China Sea.

It’s fair to say that the Asia PAC theater needs the same level of focus – or even more – today than it did previously. And this creates unique challenges for the United States military, especially in the area of communications.

Today’s military relies heavily on the advanced capabilities and intelligence that networks deliver. Bandwidth is essential at the tip of the spear for communications between soldiers in-theater and senior decision makers back at home. It’s also critical for operating drones, sharing data and enabling access to today’s real time intelligence – which is increasingly coming in the form of bandwidth-hogging video.

Unfortunately, getting data to the Asia PAC region is a challenge. Terrestrial networks simply can’t be run since they’d have to physically travel through regions owned and controlled by our adversaries. This leaves the United States military relying on satellite communications – often commercial satellite communications services – for its bandwidth needs.

This situation was eloquently summarized by Randy Bland of COMSATCOM provider, SES Space and Defense, in a recent article on the GovSat Report:

“..establishing the networks that have the available bandwidth for today’s advanced IT capabilities could take years to implement…[and] often require running fiber through nations that aren’t necessarily friendly to the United States and its military interests…It’s for this reason that satellite communication…is becoming as essential to the military as the bandwidth it provides and data it delivers. Commercial SATCOM services carry the signals from unmanned aircraft back to military decision makers. They empower video collaboration between deployed personnel and leaders in the field. They deliver the capabilities, applications and bandwidth that today’s military expects on base – out in the field.”

But getting the data to the region is just one concern. Protecting it from being degraded, compromised or otherwise impacted is another significant challenge – especially considering the adversaries the United States faces in this region. Both China and Russia are sophisticated adversaries with incredible technology at their disposal, making information assurance and security a distressing problem.

First, there’s the issue of jamming or compromising the satellite signal, itself. Luckily, this is something that is becoming a smaller problem thanks to the integration of COMSATCOM into the military satellite environment. Passing signals over COMSATCOM essentially creates deception, since it hides government traffic and data on a satellite that could be carrying other, commercial information. Then, there’s the emergence of High Throughput Satellites (HTS), which utilize “spot beams” that deliver tremendous bandwidth and throughput. These “spot beams” are smaller and more concentrated, which effectively makes the signal harder to jam since perpetrators would need to be physically in the beam’s coverage area.

Once the data and connection is physically in the region thanks to the satellite, it still needs to travel through established terrestrial networks to get to the individuals that need access to the information and bandwidth. And these networks create an additional vulnerability. They can be hacked by malicious actors employed by adversary states, they can be brought down by DDoS attacks, they can even be monitored and compromised thanks to malware.

One of the most interesting technologies receiving a lot of attention wasn’t specifically a security technology, per se. The technology I’m referring to is Software Defined Networking – or SDN. SDN is a new way to build and architecture the networks themselves, where the control and services plane of the network are virtualized. This essentially means that the plane that choreographs the network, understands its structure and defines what services are offered is now software. The virtualization of services also allows more flexibility and agility by eliminating individual “boxes” or pieces of hardware that service one purpose and replacing them with more general pieces of equipment that can be assigned a task or service function.

The end result of moving to a SDN enabled network is more agility. Changes to the network no longer require physical movement and interaction with pieces of hardware. The network is now more flexible and can be changed from one centralized application. This not only decreases downtime by decreasing human error, it allows the military to better respond to the cyberattacks that will invariably be coming from their adversaries.

Imagine a situation where traffic can be routed around devices or parts of the network that have been compromised or brought down by an adversary’s cyberattack. This is the level of flexibility and agility that SDN enables. SDN allows the military to “reshuffle the deck” while not compromising the network, or the services it’s delivering.

The Technet Asia PAC Conference couldn’t have come at a better time. The Asia Pacific theater is once again a major concern and consideration for both the military and the American people as a whole. This region also creates a host of unique and challenging problems when it comes to delivering and securing the data sharing, communications and IT capabilities today’s warfighter expects and relies on in the field. Thankfully, through an increasing reliance on COMSATCOM, advancements in SATCOM technologies, and the emergence of SDN and other security technologies, the military has the tools it needs to better establish and protect network connections in theater than ever before.

This article was originally published on The Modern Network by Mark Wiggins, the Director of DoD Business Development at Juniper Networks. Read the full, original article by clicking HERE.

Feature image courtesy of U.S. Pacific Command.

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