It’s not unusual for the NDAA to feature a number of different directives and requests for the DoD and the disparate military services. They may be asked to research ways to increase readiness. Or they may be directed to identify new ways to deliver mental or physical wellness services to enlisted service members.

But this year’s NDAA had a very specific and somewhat unusual request related to satellite communications:

“Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of the Defense Agencies, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on current commercial satellite communication initiatives, including with respect to new non-geostationary orbit satellite technologies that the Department of Defense has employed to increase satellite communication throughput to existing platforms of the military departments currently constrained by legacy capabilities.”

What are non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) commercial satellite services? They’re effectively any satellite communications service that are delivered via a satellite constellation that exists in an orbit closer to the Earth than geostationary orbit (GEO). And why is Congress so interested in NGSO satellite communications and its use by the DoD? There are a few good reasons for that.

The case for NGSO satellite
To truly oversimplify the operation of satellite networks, satellite communications function by a signal being sent into space, where it’s relayed by a satellite in orbit back to a physical location on Earth. The further the satellite is from Earth, the further that signal needs to travel – both in its initial journey to the satellite, and then in its return journey back to the Earth. The time that it takes to complete that journey is experienced by users as latency.

“Assurance is important when tools like satellite connectivity are mission-critical. The military needs to understand the risk that their satellite services face both on Earth and in space, and choose the solutions that will be available when they need them.”

By putting satellites in orbits closer to the Earth than GEO, commercial satellite providers have dramatically reduced the latency of satellite communications. When coupled with the next generation of high throughput satellite technologies, these satellites closer to Earth are capable of delivering incredibly high throughputs with incredibly low latency. This effectively results in a user experience not unlike a terrestrial fiberoptic network. But, unlike terrestrial networks, these NGSO satellite solutions are available practically anywhere on Earth – even in the most austere and geographically isolated of locations.

With the potential to deliver fiber-like connectivity to anywhere – from a military forward operating base in the middle of the desert, to a naval vessel afloat in the middle of the Pacific – it’s easy to see why Congress would be interested in the DoD investing in NGSO commercial satellite services. The use cases are almost limitless – ranging from traditional military operations, like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), to the downright futurist, like delivering telemedicine services via video teleconference.

But “NGSO” is a relatively broad term that includes a number of different satellite constellations in orbits outside of GEO. There is a veritable alphabet soup of other orbits, including Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) where commercial SATCOM providers are operating constellations. As a result, there are a number of disparate satellite operators to choose from, and a wide variety of services to choose between.

Which NGSO satellite solution is the right one?
While NGSO satellite can deliver the connectivity that the military needs in an age where practically every platform and weapons system is network and software-enabled, there could be some confusion as to which NGSO satellite service meets the needs of the DoD. And that choice will only get harder, as a number of new satellite services are set to launch in the next half-decade.

Here are three considerations that DoD decision-makers should keep in mind as they evaluate NGSO satellite services and solutions to ensure they get one that will meet mission requirements:

Is it secure?
When Internet and other critical communications services were denied at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a LEO satellite solution was rapidly made available to restore communications. Seemingly within hours, that LEO satellite service was degraded and denied, once again leaving the people of Ukraine without access to critical comms.

The provider of those services was heralded for its ability to quickly push updates to terminals and get that satellite service back online. But is that really what the military wants and needs?

As we discussed, today’s weapons systems and platforms work best when network enabled. The advanced AR, IoT, and other technology systems that the DoD is investing in for use on the battlefield are ultimately useless if they’re not connected. If today’s warfighters are trained on these systems, and are more effective with these capabilities, the military can’t have them denied – even if only temporarily.

“With the potential to deliver fiber-like connectivity to anywhere – from a military forward operating base in the middle of the desert, to a naval vessel afloat in the middle of the Pacific – it’s easy to see why Congress would be interested in the DoD investing in NGSO commercial satellite services.”

With the security of satellite communications so essential, the military should be looking for NGSO satellite solutions that have been cyber-hardened against the most pressing threats identified by the Office of Director of National Intelligence Space Threat Assessment. They should be looking for solutions that complicate an adversary’s targeting calculus by having no permanent paired linkage between U/L and D/L frequencies and polarities.

They should be looking for solutions that can quickly and easily adjust should attempts be made to jam or deny satellite service. For example, can a satellite solution rapidly adjust frequencies, polarities, power levels, bandwidth, handover timing, and beam location to avoid interference? And is there a GEO system available that can provide wide-area satellite capacity should the NGSO solution be denied?

Is it assured?
Not all of the threats to satellites are cyber and jamming threats. Sometimes there are threats to satellite communications that originate in orbit with the satellites. This includes the threat of interference and collision with other satellites in their orbit.

While GEO has traditionally been the home to most of the communications satellites in use throughout history, LEO is not exactly greenfield real estate. As of September 2021, there were 7,500 satellites in LEO. Compare that to the more than 550 satellites in GEO, and the approximately 140 satellites in MEO. Suddenly that orbit starts to sound incredibly congested. And that’s only going to get worse.

As smallsats and cubesats continue to become less expensive to purchase, and cheaper to launch, the number of them in LEO will increase exponentially. LEO is also considered by many to be the forerunner for the next generation of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites.

But, most importantly, since LEO satellites have an incredibly small Earth view, many satellites are needed in a LEO constellation to blanket the Earth in coverage. With numerous companies in a race to build LEO constellations with global coverage, LEO could see the addition of hundreds of new communications satellites in orbit just in the next few years.

Assurance is important when tools like satellite connectivity are mission-critical. The military needs to understand the risk that their satellite services face both on Earth and in space, and choose the solutions that will be available when they need them.

How much throughput is needed?
Satellite communications from GEO will play a role for the military into the future. It’s the most effective solution for covering a broad area in connectivity. NGSO satellite solutions will most likely play a more specialized role – providing incredibly high throughputs with miniscule latency for bandwidth-hungry modern IT solutions in the field.

“The advanced AR, IoT and other technology systems that the DoD is investing in for use in the battlefield are ultimately useless if they’re not connected. If today’s warfighters are trained on these systems, and are more effective with these capabilities, the military can’t have them denied – even if only temporarily.”

If the military needs to stream multiple, HD-quality ISR video streams from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or F-35s back to the military decision-makers that need the intelligence to make informed decisions, NGSO satellite is essential. Suppose the military wants to enable fiber-like connectivity for telehealth, or morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) capabilities onboard a Naval vessel in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. In that case, NGSO satellite is the correct choice.

But different NGSO satellite solutions offer different levels of capacity and bandwidth. If a large amount of bandwidth is needed, the DoD should be looking for a solution that can deliver multiple GBPS to each individual terminal – which should be more than enough capacity for even the most bandwidth-hungry of applications.

Considering the importance of fiber-like connectivity for the next generation of military platforms and weapons systems, it’s easy to understand why Congress specifically asked for a report on the military’s use of NGSO commercial satellite services in the most recent NDAA. But, if the DoD is going to begin to increase its reliance on NGSO solutions, it needs to ensure it’s choosing the right offering for its requirements. Security, assurance, and throughputs are just three of the many considerations they should keep in mind when evaluating solutions, but they’re quite possibly three of the most essential.

To learn more about how NGSO satellite services from MEO can deliver advanced capabilities to the warfighter, click HERE to download a complimentary copy of the whitepaper, “A New Era of Connectivity.”

Featured image: U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Cameron J. Rider establishes satellite communication with the combat operations center. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Pfc. Ulises Salgado). The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

The post 3 Considerations for Choosing the Best NGSO Satellite Solution appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

However, there is a new approach to acquiring commercial satellite services that is rapidly gaining traction across the government – a movement towards satellite managed services – that promises to bring more innovative, more affordable satellite solutions to government users. As the government begins to shift from leased capacity to this new “Satellite as a Service” approach to satellite acquisition, commercial satellite providers are working to introduce exciting new technologies that can deliver the added resiliency, scalability, and flexibility needed to meet the demands of government users.

One of these providers – SES Space and Defense– has invested heavily into new systems and satellites that will enable the company to deliver high-throughput satellite connectivity to government users from multiple orbits, ensuring that its satellite service offering will be capable of meeting even the most bandwidth-hungry missions that absolutely demand assurance and resiliency.

A cornerstone in the company’s plan to offer multi-orbit connectivity to government users as a service is the recently-launched SES-17 satellite, a revolutionary High-Throughput Satellite (HTS) that was sent into orbit in October of this year.

To learn more about the SES-17 satellite, why the company refers to it as a satellite that was “built for managed services,” and what makes satellite managed services so attractive to the United States government and military, we recently sat down with Amit Katti and Rashid Neighbors of SES Space and Defense.

Government Satellite Report (GSR): SES-17 was launched in late October, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s in use already, correct? What is the current status of the SES-17 satellite, and when is it expected to go into service?

Amit Katti: SES-17 was successfully launched onboard an Ariane 5 launcher operated by Arianespace from a spaceport in Kourou, French Guiana on October 23, 2021. Currently, the satellite is on its way to geosynchronous orbit (GEO).

Carolyn Cuppernull: Once in orbit, [SES-17] will undergo in-orbit testing for optimal performance with the goal to commence services on June 15, 2022. So, anticipate that SES-17 will commence service in about four months.

GSR: Recently, when SES has talked about the exciting new technologies that it’s implementing in its spacecraft and ground segment, the company is touting its upcoming O3b mPOWER MEO satellite solution. Is SES-17 a part of that? If not, what is the difference?

Rashid Neighbors: SES’ O3b mPOWER service is a low-latency, high throughput satellite service offering that is anticipated to launch in Q1 of 2022. That service utilizes High Throughput Satellites (HTS) at an orbit closer to Earth – at Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) – to deliver incredibly high throughputs at extremely low latency.

While SES-17 is an HTS, much like the satellites that power the O3b mPOWER service, it will operate in GEO.

There are many reasons why a government agency or military organization would want to utilize a commercial satellite service delivered from GEO. Depending on the mission and the use case, a GEO satellite solution with a larger coverage area may be ideal. Or the data being transferred via the satellite may not suffer from slightly higher latency – such as voice data.

Ultimately, our intent is to provide the U.S. Government with highly resilient, multi-orbit hybrid satellite solutions. While the spacecraft technology in SES-17 and the O3b mPOWER satellites is fundamentally different, the ground system will be integrated through a centralized system called ARC. This allows our government customers to focus on their mission and applications and let SES Space and Defense worry about how the transport works.

GSR: You mentioned a system called ARC. What is that specifically, and what does it do?

Amit Katti: ARC functions like the motherboard for a computer. It basically creates a common interface for different processing units.

With ARC, we can coordinate mission assurance across different technologies and orbits. We can also manage the space and ground segment resources, together, for our U.S. government and military customers.

GSR: In our past conversations, you’ve referred to SES-17 as a satellite built for managed services. How is a satellite managed service different from how the government and military have traditionally acquired satellite capacity? Why would the government and military want to make a move towards managed services?

Carolyn Cuppernull: Typically, the government has worked with multiple commercial satellite service providers to lease or purchase wholesale bandwidth that it then distributes to its users, as needed. Ultimately, this system of purchasing capacity on the spot market was expensive for the government and limited its ability to leverage new technologies being leveraged by the commercial satellite industry.

A recent trend that we’re seeing in the government and military is a movement towards a managed service model. In this model, everything that is necessary for an end-to-end satellite network is delivered as a service. The satellite capacity, the ground hardware – including terminals and antennas – are all included in the service.

Rashid Neighbors: With a managed service model for satellite services, the government would always have the latest commercial technologies and solutions available to them. With systems like ARC in place, they’ll also have the added resiliency and capability of being able to leverage a multi-orbit constellation. This means they would have access to low-latency, high-throughput connectivity from MEO, as well as wideband high-throughput connectivity from GEO, and they would be able to seamlessly switch between those resources based on their mission requirements.

The government and military rarely operate in static conditions. The environment changes, the mission shifts and evolves. Having a satellite managed service that gives them access to the latest and greatest technologies, as well as a multi-orbit satellite constellation ensures that they’ll always have the communications and connectivity they need to accomplish their mission – even if mission parameters or requirements change.

The technologies in SES-17, and the development of the ARC system, make this satellite a natural fit for the “Satellite as a Service” model, since it enables us to listen to the government’s and military’s requirements, and tailor a multi-orbit satellite solution that meets their needs and helps them accomplish their mission.

GSR: What is the coverage area of SES-17? Where will the government and military be able to leverage the services of this satellite, in particular?

Amit Katti: SES-17 will service the majority of North and South America. The satellite will also provide coverage to an area that is of incredible importance to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), delivering services to parts of the Arctic Circle. Coverage will extend east into Africa, and cover a large part of Europe, as well.

SES-17 also offers coverage over much of the Atlantic Ocean, delivering seamless connectivity for maritime and air travel between the Americas and Europe.

To learn more about SES-17 and its potential to enable multi-orbit satellite managed services to the government and military, click HERE.

The post Satellite Managed Services Take Off with Successful SES-17 Launch appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

The establishment of a new branch of the military isn’t unheard of, but it also hasn’t happened in a long time. The military started with one branch – the United States Army – in 1775 and then expanded to three with the introduction of the Navy and Marines later that same year. Another branch wouldn’t be added until 1915, when the Coast Guard was established. The number of branches reached its current number of five when the Air Force was established as its own branch in 1947, following World War II and the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947.

The military has stayed as those five branches for 71 years – at least until now, with this directive to begin ramping up a Space Force.

Launching and establishing a separate Space Force has been met with a somewhat mixed reaction – most likely because it does sound like something right out of science fiction. However, the concept of creating a Space Force is indicative of a new reality in space that’s become increasingly worrisome for our military – space is no longer a benign domain.

The idea that our adversaries have witnessed the strategic advantage that space and satellite capabilities give our military and are working to deny this advantage is one that’s discussed every time military leaders responsible for the space domain are together. Here are just a few quotes from senior military space officials and influencers that have been reported in the Government Satellite Report in the past year:

“Adversaries have had a front-row seat, watching our success and figuring out the operational, strategical, and tactical advantages that we gain from [SATCOM].” – Lt. Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, Commander of Air Force Space Command

“Cyber attack against a variety of communications networks is a difficult challenge. But the far simpler thing that Russia can do. That North Korea can do. That Iran can do. That Botswana can do. That some guy in the middle of a field with a TV truck can do…is jamming. Jamming is very hard to protect against, unless you have the right equipment.” – Douglas Loverro, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy

Making a Space Force
There is clearly consensus and understanding that space is now a warfighting domain, and the directive to ramp up a Space Force is at least evidence of that fact. But starting a new branch of the military is not something that’s going to happen overnight.

In fact, the impetus to start a new branch of the military requires more than just a directive from the President – it also requires action from Congress. As Jonathan Turley, a professor at Georgetown University’s law school, recently told Defense News, “…Congress alone has the power to establish a new branch of the military and to establish the positions of senior executive officials to lead such a department.”

Between the requirement to get Congressional approval for the Space Force, and the logistics required to make it a reality, the Space Force could take years to get off of the ground. But the threat to America’s satellites and space resources is real today. With a clear threat to overcome and an unknown amount of time needed to get the Space Force established, it’s clear that faster and more expedient steps to protect our space capabilities should be considered – and that’s where commercial satellites could help.

Today’s advanced high-throughput and MEO satellite constellations feature advanced technologies that are inherently more secure and harder to jam. But the use of commercial satellites in conjunction with existing military satellite constellations offers mission assurance and resiliency in other ways, as well.

By spreading military signals across a combination of military satellites and commercial satellites, it becomes increasingly difficult for adversaries to identify which satellites to compromise. It also becomes nearly impossible to deny satellite capabilities by compromising one, or multiple satellites, since others would be available to carry that load.

Ultimately, commercial satellites can play a hand in enabling multiple resiliency factors that can – when combined – make our satellite infrastructure significantly more secure without immense investment.

As Doug Loverro recently said during a Defense One-organized, “Cocktails and Conversations,” event, “It’s going to be a combination of proliferation, disaggregation, diversity, distribution, protection, proliferation and deception. Those factors can combine for any space capability that we know about to make them resilient, and – quite frankly – it doesn’t cost a lot of money if you combine them correctly.”

Regardless of whether the Space Force is the appropriate step at the appropriate time to help protect our space assets and satellites, the fact that it’s being considered is evidence that resiliency and readiness in space is a paramount concern and that space is no longer benign. But there are steps that we can take to protect these space assets now, while we explore other solutions – and embracing commercial satellites is a cost effective and efficient step in the right direction.

To learn more about the ways that commercial satellite services are being used within the military, click on the following resources:

• GovSat: A new concept in secure communications
• High Throughput on the High Seas
• High Throughput Satellites for U.S. Government Applications

The post Before the Space Force – how COMSATCOM can increase resiliency now appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

That might now seem like a particularly interesting or insightful thing to say. It could come off as simple pandering to a room full of satellite professionals. But it’s quite true and becoming increasingly obvious to even the casual observer. At a time when space exploration and advancements in space and satellite technology are no longer dominating the news or making headlines, we’ve quietly seen a huge resurgence in both interest and investment in space.

That interest isn’t just on behalf of the federal government, either. A new generation of satellites and new satellite technologies are opening the door for satellite to deliver the IT services that many with high speed broadband connections take for granted to every corner of the globe. Advances in technology and robotics are also creating smaller, cheaper satellites and even satellites that can service and refuel other satellites. All the while, the emergence of new companies in the commercial launch space is making access to space cheaper.

The industry is rapidly evolving, and that change is generating a lot of excitement across the government, military and the industry itself. We’re excited to document these changes and chronicle where the industry goes next.

Here are some of the most interesting satellite articles that we saw in the past few weeks, which prove that satellite is one of the busiest and most interesting industries today:

US Air Force to put sensors on allies’ satellites
Every government-focused satellite conference or event that we  attend eventually hits on the topic of mission assurance in space and defending our satellite infrastructure. It’s become an essential topic and major challenge for our military as adversaries have grown increasingly capable of denying satellite communications and capabilities, and our warfighters have grown ever more reliant on IT-enabled tools and services.

This article in Defense One discusses steps that our military is taking to help ensure mission assurance in space, and it’s something that we’ve discussed frequently in the past on the Government Satellite Report – hosted payloads.

We’ve speculated in the past that putting military payloads on other satellites – including commercial satellites – could make it harder for adversaries to target and deny satellite capabilities, and that’s exactly what the military is looking to do. However, instead of just using commercial satellites, they’re placing sensors on satellites belonging to our allies.

This is an exciting step that – if proven useful – could expand to the military placing sensors and transponders on commercial satellites with increased frequency in the future. The benefit would be an integrated satellite architecture of commercial, allied and military-owned satellites that would be almost impossible to fully compromise and that could very quickly fill military satellite requirements should a military satellite be denied.

ESA and SES-led consortium to develop satellite-based cybersecurity
The military has other concerns about the safety and security of satellites and satellite communications aside from the jamming of satellites or adversaries shooting them down. One of those concerns involves cybersecurity and satellite signals being intercepted or altered.

You could imagine the chaos and problems that could emerge for U.S. soldiers if they received inaccurate information via satellite from one of our adversaries, or if their locations or other sensitive information was intercepted. This is the reality that the military is looking to avoid.

Well, the European Space Agency (ESA) and a consortium of satellite providers and satellite technology companies are now teaming up in an effort to increase the security of satellites and satellite communications. The consortium, which is being led by satellite communications provider, SES, will seek to develop, “a system that will allow the generation of encryption keys from space, as well as their secure transmission to users on Earth via laser.”

The system has been named the Quantum Cryptography Telecommunication System (QUARTZ), and it is intended to be, “a new platform aimed at providing a global service for next-generation encryption keys for use in geographically dispersed networks. “

Defense Department turning over space traffic management to Commerce, but details still unclear
All of that excitement and new activity in space that we mentioned before comes with a price. There are 1,500 active satellites in orbit already, and there are new satellite companies out there proposing to launch constellations that will add thousands more across multiple orbits.

Every one of those new satellites creates a new challenge for the folks that work to ensure that satellites don’t hit each other and that traffic and congestion in space doesn’t result in the same kind of calamities as traffic and congestion on our roads and highways.

To this end, the DoD has announced that it will be turning over the management of space traffic to an unlikely new ally, the Department of Commerce. Details on the transition remain somewhat unclear and it’s not entirely known how and when the transition will be completed, but it’s a move that many in the industry are considering a positive step forward that will help encourage continued private investment in space.

As Doug Loverro, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy told SpaceNews. “The good news is that several years ago this same committee was clearly against DoD ever losing control of this vital function. So I would say that this represents true progress in moving this inherently civil function to a civil agency.”

The post An exciting time for space means exciting satellite news appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

In his position with the Department of Defense (DoD), Mr. Kitay is responsible for establishing policy and guidance for the assurance of space capabilities for both our nation and our allies. He also helps guide DoD strategy for addressing space-related issues, and leads DoD activities in international space cooperation. Needless to say, Mr. Kitay is well positioned with his finger on the pulse of the Nation’s current and future space architecture, policy development and implementation and the associated national space and security implications.

The theme of Mr. Kitay’s address was, “A Strategy for Protecting and Advancing our Vital Interests in Space,” a theme that has been repeated frequently at many of the space conferences that we’ve attended in the past few years. But before breaking into the familiar messaging about the need to defend our nation’s space capabilities, Mr. Kitay discussed why right now is a very exciting time for satellites and space.

Government gives space its due
According to Mr. Kitay, the space and satellite field has, “an energy and excitement that is nothing short of remarkable.” As for the reasons why there is so much energy around space and satellites, Mr. Kitay chalked it up to two separate factors: technology advancements and attention from the very top of the government.

“We could spend an entire day talking about all of the technology changes that are happening directly within the space sector or outside of the space sector that are being applied to it,” Mr. Kitay explained. “Space is getting a lot of attention these days. Our most senior levels of government – from our President to Congress to the recently-instated National Space Council – are all focused on U.S. leadership in space across all sectors – National Security, Civil and Commercial.”

Mr. Kitay went on to explain that the attention being paid to space and satellites from the brass of the military and federal government wasn’t just talk, but had the added validity of additional investment and budget dollars. As Mr. Kitay explained, “From a DoD space perspective, the President’s budget included an additional $1B in this year’s budget request and an additional $8B over a five year planning period for space.”

But that attention, energy and interest in space and satellites isn’t just because there are new technologies being brought to bear in the industry. It has a lot to do with the changing space environment and the increased threats to our space infrastructure. This brings us to a very familiar topic in the industry.

Adversaries in space
Mr. Kitay did an excellent job of laying out the current challenge facing the DoD in space when he said, “While there are a multitude of friendly international activities and partnerships in space, there is also – unfortunately – a very serious scope and growing maturity of foreign counter-space capabilities. Hands-down, this is the most significant change in space from a DoD perspective. Because of these threats, space is not a sanctuary and we have now recognized space as a warfighting domain. As a result, we need to be prepared to treat it as such.“

This isn’t a new topic. Rather, it’s a topic that has dominated the military space and satellite conversation for what seems like years. However, there is a very good reason for the military to be taking this seriously, as warfighters have grown increasingly reliant on satellite services and IT tools that satellites enable. U.S. adversaries have grown increasingly capable of denying satellite capabilities to these warfighters.

Mr. Kitay laid out multiple different ways in which the DoD is looking to improve assurance, including, “through resilience, defensive operations, reconstitution and…even…satellite servicing.” But made it clear that attaining assurance was both essential and complex when he said, “We must assure our space capabilities so that we’re prepared to prevail in any environment and against any threat. Let me underscore that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to space mission assurance. Just as there are a variety of threats and a variety of missions to perform, we are going to need a variety of capabilities, tactics and techniques to achieve our mission.”

However, there is one way that mission assurance can be improved and according to Mr. Kitay, this gave for the increased excitement around satellites and space – new technology.

Commercial blazes a path to assurance
Taking advantage of innovation from the satellite industry is one way that the military can improve mission assurance quickly and effectively. Utilizing Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Geostationary (GEO) HTS satellite constellations from commercial satellite providers that incorporate the latest in satellite technologies can mitigate the potential for adversaries to deny the military satellite capabilities in a number of ways.

First, these satellites are – by their nature – more difficult to jam, and jamming remains one of the easiest and most effective ways for adversaries to deny satellite capabilities. As Doug Loverro, Mr. Kitay’s predecessor as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, recently said, “Cyber attack against a variety of communications networks is a difficult challenge. But the far simpler thing that Russia can do. That North Korea can do. That Iran can do. That Botswana can do. That some guy in the middle of a field with a TV truck can do…is jamming. Jamming is very hard to protect against, unless you have the right equipment.”

But there is more to commercial services than simply protecting against jamming. They also provide other benefits by simply distributing and disaggregating military communications across multiple satellite constellations and providers – making it harder for adversaries to specifically target satellites carrying military signals, and even harder to deny them by compromising a single satellite.

As Mr. Kitay made abundantly clear, the threat of adversaries impacting our nation’s satellites remains the largest and most essential challenge for the DoD to overcome. Thankfully, new satellite technologies, led by the commercial industry, are doing more than drumming up excitement for space – they’re providing the Department of Defense with a clear and capable set of solutions able to effectively improve our National Security Space architecture.

MEO and HTS constellations are the latest commercial innovations being embraced by the federal government, capable of securely delivering fiber-like bandwidth to practically anywhere on the planet. For additional information on these solutions, download the following resources:

• High Throughput on the High Seas
• White Paper: Satellite Evolution Sparks a Service Revolution
• High Throughput Satellites for U.S. Government Applications
• White Paper On O3b “Fiber Like” Satellite Communications for U.S. Government Applications

The post AFA breakfast paints space as exciting but challenging domain for the DoD appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

During the first part of our discussion, we defined and explained CNSSP-12 and discussed how it has evolved and changed as it’s been reevaluated and refreshed over time to keep up with shifting threats. We also looked at how the policy has helped commercial satellite communications providers service the military more securely.

In part two of our discussion, Andrew shares his predictions for what the next iteration of CNSSP-12 will look like, discusses how it will impact the industry, and provides insights into how CNSSP-12 can shape space policy across the military in the very near future, thanks to the ongoing Wideband Satellite Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) being conducted by the Air Force.

Here is what Andrew had to say:

Government Satellite Report (GSR): The updated CNSSP-12 hasn’t been released yet, but can you tell us what changes you’re anticipating for commercial providers when the new, updated policy is revealed?

Andrew D’Uva: When the policy is released, I anticipate that we’ll see an increased focus from the government on verifying the security posture of these commercial solutions.

In the past, industry designed their systems and then – if they were going to play in the government and military market – they would go back and try to implement U.S. Government security requirements at a later stage. Now, they’re working to incorporate these things into these satellite systems at design time and maintain them throughout the system lifecycle. This shows industry is starting to think about security up front.

I anticipate that the new CNSSP-12 guidance will take advantage of that new attitude and incorporate much more information sharing between industry and government. This will ensure that the government is aware and informed about the steps that industry is taking to make their solutions reliable, robust, and secure.

This will lead government to require more security assurance systems in place for commercial satellite solutions, and more auditing. What I expect to see is much more focus on formalizing processes, taking a quality management approach, documenting things and making security part of the daily activities of managing these systems.

GSR: Will the CNSSP-12 refresh have any impact on the developing Wideband AoA and the USG’s ability to better harmonize commercial and military space architectures?

Andrew D’Uva: This is really an important question due to what is currently happening across the military in regard to satellite architectures. Up until now – in terms of SATCOM – the U.S. military has first relied on purpose-built satellites that they own and operate and looked to commercial meet excess demand. I’m talking about AEHF, WGS, and MUOS, which are used for different missions, including strategic nuclear command and control, tactical protected SATCOM, wideband SATCOM, and narrow-band, tactical SATCOM. All of those have performed well, and have their benefits and drawbacks.

Commercial wideband systems have been, until the recent introduction of managed services, largely transponded capacity where the Government’s focus was ensuring positive control of the commercial satellite bus, not necessarily the underlying communications services.

Looking forward, the government is trying to figure out if it makes sense to continue to use these siloes of purpose-built constellations and use commercial to fill in the rest, or, to what extent should commercial infrastructure solutions be part of meeting the baseline demand and integrated into an enduring architecture that spans both government and commercial capabilities.

Despite there being a two-decade track record of success in using commercial solutions securely, for the government to be really comfortable in advocating for an integrated architecture – which is supported by industry – they need to be confident in the level of security and mission assurance.

The security requirements like those in CNSSP-12, NIST cybersecurity framework and other cybersecurity guidance and policies will ensure that the SATCOM industry can continue to participate in an environment that is increasingly non-benign. The environment that we’re in and are moving into in the future is one in which our adversaries are seeking to do us harm through cyber effects. In this environment, the government needs to know that the security posture of wideband COMSATCOM systems is on par with purpose-built MILSATCOM systems.

I believe that many commercial systems are on par, but that’s not the perception of some military decision makers. I’ve had senior level defense decision makers tell me that MILSATCOM is held to a higher cybersecurity standard than COMSATCOM. However, COMSATCOM satellites are held to the same requirements contractually by DOD. A lot of government personnel don’t realize that – they think commercial is lesser than and not as secure as MILSATCOM. They don’t realize that COMSATCOM typically has secured locations, cleared personnel and high security standards. I’ve seen cases where once that’s understood, military leaders are willing to consider commercial solutions, including their unique benefits.

Since CNSSP-12 applies to both military and commercial satellites it should help military decision makers to adopt an enduring role in an integrated wideband SATCOM enterprise architecture for qualified COMSATCOM solutions.

Now, there are certain military SATCOM missions – such as nuclear command and control that are designed to work in a nuclear war environment – that requires a higher level of mission assurance than will ever be offered by commercial providers. Those special missions will always require costly, custom-built government satellites. But for most missions, COMSATCOM can fill that need if operators have implemented these security requirements. If some commercial offerors haven’t implemented them, those solutions may be fine for other commercial or government uses, but not for national security missions.

GSR: What does the COMSATCOM industry need from the military to make this a reality? How can the military incentivize the industry to incorporate CNSSP-12 requirements into their systems and service offerings?

Andrew D’Uva: The government needs to match its acquisition policy and practice to the policies that are levied. The government needs to move away from simply looking at the lowest priced solution as being the best solution. They first need to look at effectiveness and cyber security before looking at price. If there are participants in the acquisition process that don’t meet these security requirements, they need to be ruled out as not technically acceptable. Then the military can focus on competition among the multiple compliant suppliers.

That has not yet happened. There are many reasons, but they primarily have to do with the way that COMSATCOM typically has been funded. COMSATCOM is typically funded from Overseas Contingency Operations money, which is short-term money that is available to a Combatant Command and it’s not in the baseline DoD budget. Military purpose-built SATCOM programs, which are programs of record, don’t charge fees to the user when they’re utilized. This makes it seem that – from a user perspective – MILSATCOM is free while COMSATCOM costs money. The truth is that everything costs the taxpayer money.

So, it’s a function of how these budgeting processes work, and we need to fix that.

If you look at the FY18 NDAA, there is a section in there – Section 1601 – that assigns the Commander of Air Force Space Command as the DoD acquisition authority for COMSATCOM leases, in consultation with the DoD CIO. That is a major change and will be a very important one to watch in 2018.

For the very first time – when that change is done – the organization that builds the wideband SATCOM programs of record will be the same as the organization that has authority to lease COMSATCOM capacity.

In the past, DISA handled commercial leases and Space Command handled programs of record. The two sides never needed to make a budget or resource decision about how to best spend taxpayer dollars between those two acquisition approaches for SATCOM capabilities. But, a year from now, there will be one acquisition authority.

This will be the first time the DoD will be organizationally structured to make those decisions and spend the taxpayer’s money more effectively while still getting the resources and capabilities it needs. That also means that 2018 will be the first time that the government will be able to drive industry into participating in an integrated architecture. It’s a great opportunity for all of us to ensure the nation has the SATCOM capabilities it needs.

If you missed part one of our two-part conversation with Andrew D’Uva, click HERE to read it in its entirety.

The post Analyzing the Impact of the CNSSP-12 Refresh with Andrew D’Uva of Providence Access Company appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

One of the military’s largest concerns today involves the space domain. Space is increasingly congested and our adversaries are becoming increasingly capable of compromising and attacking our satellites. With many military IT capabilities, applications and services traveling over satellites, cybersecurity is becoming increasingly essential.

One of the policies that the government has put in place to ensure the security of the satellites the military is utilizing in-theater is Committee on National Security Systems Policy 12 (CNSSP-12). That policy is currently being reevaluated and refreshed, and new standards and requirements are scheduled to be released shortly.

To learn more about CNSSP-12, its history and its impact on the satellite industry, we sat down with Andrew D’Uva, the President of Providence Access Co. and the U.S. Industry Liaison on the Commercial Space Infosec Working Group (CSIWG), which is giving the satellite industry a voice in the CNSSP-12 refresh process.

During the first part of a two-part interview with Andrew, we define CNSSP-12, explore how it’s evolved over time, and how it helps the Commercial Satellite Communication or COMSATCOM industry serve the federal government. Here is what Andrew had to say:

Government Satellite Report (GSR): What is the CNSSP-12? Why is a review and update currently being done? What is the status of the CNSSP-12 review/update right now?

Andrew D’Uva: The CNSSP-12 is effectively the CNSS policy number twelve. It’s a formal policy of the CNSS, which is the Committee on National Security Systems – a U.S. government interagency committee comprised of the DOD, National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI, the branches of the military, and other national security-focused government agencies and entities.

The CNSS puts out policies and implementation guidance on a variety of information security issues by developing operating policies, procedures, guidelines, directives, instructions and standards. Issues can range from the use of cryptography, secure modes of communications and other security challenges facing the nation.

CNSS Policy 12 is the evolution of an earlier set of policies designed to apply to the cybersecurity of space systems used to support national security missions.

This policy isn’t new, although it periodically gets updated. In the past, it applied to the U.S. government at large. However, about ten years ago, it was updated to clarify that its requirements would apply to foreign and commercial systems used to support national security missions. That was the first time that the government said, “Here is a set of government requirements that apply to COMSATCOM operators and solution providers serving national security missions.”

In the past, COMSATCOM providers wouldn’t have to worry about a policy like this – they would just provide a commercial solution to the government. But the new, updated policy implied a number of cyber security requirements needed to be added to these systems due to their critical role in national security missions.

The policy was updated as part of a normal review process that is supposed to occur every few years. That review process is occurring again right now, with a new update anticipated to be released in early 2018. These updates and reviews are necessary because threats change, and the government’s approach to vulnerabilities has to change and evolve with them.

GSR: You mentioned that CNSSP-12 has been updated and changed over time. What has changed and what new requirements have been added?

Andrew D’Uva: CNSSP-12 levied a requirement in the past stating COMSATCOM systems that served national security missions would have to use what is called NSA-approved cryptography and cryptosystems to protect the satellite command uplink between the ground and satellite. That meant that satellite operators had to design, equip, and operate their satellites using a system that had been reviewed and approved by the NSA on their spacecraft that would apply an approved cryptographic system implementation to secure the commands between the ground and the satellites.

NSA-approved solutions protect the confidentiality and integrity of the commands, preventing third parties from seeing or altering commands in transit to the satellite. This was a requirement that applied to government systems in the past, but the CNSSP-12 policy effectively extended it to commercial systems.

As a result, almost all communications satellite companies that want to do business with the military have worked this into their satellites. It costs them more money and there’s more security involved, but it’s been largely accepted by industry. It has largely been a policy success for the government.

The policy change and update in 2012 involved a new requirement for securing the telemetry – the information traveling from the satellite to the ground regarding its health, safety and monitoring.

The update called for similar NSA-approved systems to be used to protect that information in the downlink direction. That has been slower to be adopted by industry because of a lack of available systems. However, we’re starting to see that get worked into COMSATCOM systems that are used for national security missions.

GSR: How does the CNSSP-12 enable commercial operators to better serve government needs?

Andrew D’Uva: Ultimately, all of these policies and policy changes are all about reliability and robustness. The government wants to use COMSATCOM and commercial imagery, but they want to be sure that those solutions are of high quality and available when needed. CNSSP-12 improved that resilience posture and made them more robust.

A satellite with these solutions – in contrast to one without them – is less vulnerable to being impacted by adversaries. With space becoming an increasingly contested environment, and with our adversaries recognizing the advantage that the U.S. military gains from its satellite infrastructure, this is an increasingly realistic concern for today and into the future.

GSR: How are the commercial operators participating in the CNSSP-12 refresh effort? How has this matured over time?

Andrew D’Uva: Up until this last refresh cycle, the government was the sole driver of the refresh activities. However, in the last refresh cycle, the government – specifically the NSA and DISA – established a working group called the Commercial Space Infosec Working Group (CSIWG), which was open to U.S. industry and designed to look at information security issues, including policy issues.

I serve as the U.S. Industry Liaison, and I lead the CSIWG with two other leaders from the NSA and DISA, respectively, along with a steering committee of industry executives. The CSIWG meets a couple of times a year at various sites, and – through the efforts of the NSA – they work to inform industry about the policy review process and get industry comments.

Through the CSIWG, industry leaders have authored a series of inputs and comments for the government. These comments specifically addressed the current policy, the role of commercial providers, the applicability of CNSSP-12 to commercial systems, as well as some technical issues with downlink telemetry and transmission security and how it is applied. The NSA then took these comments and inputs into the process for consideration.

The government hasn’t shared this revised CNSSP-12 yet with industry, but there are indications that some of that input was taken into account and worked into this guidance.

In part two of our two-part Q&A interview with Andrew D’Uva, he shares his predictions for what will change in the refreshed CNSSP-12, discusses how it will impact space policy for the military, and talks about the impact of CNSSP-12 on the SATCOM industry.

The post Demystifying the CNSSP-12 with Andrew D’Uva of Providence Access Company appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

Ultimately, the largest trend that was discussed at the event was the need for the government and military’s space infrastructure to change in the face of a drastically more congested and contested domain. This topic  was well-illustrated by Dr. Brian Weeden, a panelist and Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation, when he said:

“There’s…a growing use of space for military and national security purposes by the US and other countries. And all of these things together generate challenges – physical congestion, greater frequency congestion, and also the potential for space to be part of future conflicts. That’s a huge set of challenges – and also opportunities – that the military is trying to deal with.”

Space is becoming increasingly incorporated in conflict planning and military exercises. CNN recently highlighted this new battleground in their special “War in Space: The Next Battlefield” which premiered last month. The domain is being relied on more heavily for the delivery of actionable intelligence and mission-critical capabilities and communications in theater. It’s also becoming a capability that the military is looking to better share and integrate with both international partners and the intelligence community.

These necessary changes were extoled by Mr. Winston Beauchamp, the Director of the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor Staff and Deputy Under Secretary (Space) of the U.S. Air Force, when he said:

“Just look at all of the changes that we’ve made just in the last year. We’ve changed the way we exercise. In July at the Red Flag exercise, the Air Expeditionary Commander – someone that has always been an air operator – was Col. Deanna Burke, the Commander of the 50th Space Wing. We changed the way the relationship between air and space operates. We changed how we collaborate with our international partners…We’ve changed the way we present space forces to the combatant commanders by building a space mission force that understands what it takes to operate through a contested environment. We changed our Op centers and are well on the road to modernizing our battle management command and control capability. And we’ve changed the way we integrate with our intelligence community partners – much closer collaboration than ever – because – when you’re in a contested environment – you have to understand what your partners are doing in response to a threat…”

But these changes aren’t the only result of the shifting space domain.

Looking ahead and analyzing the best path forward

A more congested and contested domain has led the military to look forward to the future of their space and satellite infrastructure for 2030 and beyond. As we discussed in our previous post, this is beginning with an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for military wideband satellite, which will analyze all possible ways in which the military can build a next-generation space and satellite network that will deliver the mission assurance that the military needs in space today, and into the future.

What is the current status of the military wideband AoA? It’s in its infancy.

The AoA is, unfortunately, very complex and intricate, with many disparate organizations and parties involved in its development. Instead of being done entirely with input from the DoD and Air Force, this AoA is being drafted with input from international partners and private industry – including the COMSATCOM providers whose networks will undoubtedly become more relied on to carry military communications and capabilities during conflicts.

This more complex AoA has taken significantly more time to coordinate and start than many outside of the government had anticipated. As of yet, the completion date remains “TBD.”

According to Robert Tarleton, Jr, the Director of the MILSATCOM Systems Directorate, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command, “It’ll be done when we’ve answered all of the questions that we have to address. [AoA’s] typically take around 18 months or so. But this one is going to be complex because we’ve got commercial partners in the planning and conduct of the AoA, as well as international partners that are participating as well.”

However, Mr. Tarleton did insinuate that COMSATCOM could be playing a larger role in military SATCOM needs in the future when he said, “…purpose built satellite, commercial systems – that’s hard to figure out right now. There’s going to be some mix, there’s no doubt about it.”

But the AoA isn’t being shaped with just input from international and industry partners, alone. There are other intelligence and information sources that are expected to help define and shape the AoA – and subsequently the nation’s military satellite infrastructure – moving forward.

Path forward defined by Pathfinders and Pilot Programs

In addition to gathering intelligence and information for the creation of the AoA from international partners and experts in private industry, the military is also conducting a series of Pathfinder and Pilot Programs. These programs are designed to create insights and information into the feasibility of disparate purchasing and operating models for SATCOM services.

<Click HERE to access a two-part podcast series focused on the Pathfinder Program and the benefits it has generated for the Air Force.>

The first COMSATCOM Pathfinder, which involved the Air Force acquiring a transponder on an in-orbit satellite over Africa, was widely considered a success by decision makers in the DoD. However, the next Pathfinder program, Pathfinder Two, has met some internal resistance and has been delayed and subsequently altered from its original intent and design – to purchase a transponder prior to launch and then have the ability to trade capacity on that transponder for capacity on other satellites that are providing coverage in geographic areas of need.

According to Mr. Tarleton, “The intent was to look at the business and acquisition processes. So, what has actually changed is our approach to how we’re going to do Pathfinder Two. We hoped to initially have – at contract award – access to the whole constellation of whichever company we had bought from, equal to the bandwidth we had bought. With the funding and some of the other regulations we had run into, we just weren’t able to do that. We’re actually going to not have that capability available to us until after the satellite itself is launched.”

But, despite these setbacks, the military is optimistic that some Pathfinder data – as well as learning from other pilot programs – can be incorporated into the wideband AoA. However, they’ll have to move fast to complete Pathfinder Two, and its successor – Pathfinder Three. Unfortunately, similar setbacks and challenges in how the military is using funds could make it difficult for these programs to be completed in time to influence the AoA.

According to Mr. Tarleton, “With Pathfinder Three, we are also trying to get the funds recolored. That’s going to have to happen very quickly. And, an action was taken and I’m not sure if that’s going to be able to be completed on time…”

Whether findings from the Pathfinder programs are incorporated or not, the wideband AoA marks a clear and deliberate attempt by the military to evolve their space and satellite infrastructure to better meet the challenges of an increasingly congested and contested domain.

By incorporating private industry in both the planning and construction of the nation’s next-generation satellite network, the military is working hard to ensure that this network not only can deliver communications and capabilities effectively and efficiently to the warfighter, but also has the mission assurance necessary to ensure that these capabilities are never compromised.

In our next article on the GovSat Report, we’ll look at another program that was mentioned at the morning briefing, which could fundamentally change the way the military approaches the command, control and management of their military satellite constellation.

*Featured image courtesy of Defense One

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One of the most exciting and interesting new technologies that was discussed at this year’s conference – surprisingly – wasn’t a topic of a panel discussion, or available to see and play with on the exposition floor. Rather, it was casually mentioned during the Q&A session by Dr. Gordon Roesler, a Program Manager in the Tactical Technology Office (TTO) at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), following a panel discussion on hosted payloads.

During the aforementioned Q&A session, Dr. Roesler stood up and addressed the panelists about the need to change payloads and otherwise service spacecraft in orbit. He also introduced panel attendees to a new DARPA program that would utilize robotics to do just that.

Enthralled by this new concept and eager to know more, I asked Dr. Roesler to participate in an interview for the GovSat Report, so that he could educate publication readers and staff – alike – about this new program.

Here is what Dr. Roesler had to say:

GovSat Report: During one of the panels at this year’s SATELLITE 2016 Conference, you discussed a new program from DARPA aiming to use robotics to make changes or repairs to satellites in space. What are the main factors driving a program like this forward? What types of missions is DARPA looking to accomplish with this program?

Dr. Roesler: The program is called Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS). The goal of the program is to create a dexterous robotic operational capability in Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), that can both provide increased resilience for the current US space infrastructure, and be the first concrete step toward a transformed space architecture with revolutionary capabilities.

Today, satellites are placed in orbit, but then are never inspected, repaired or upgraded. They have long lifetimes, but the technology on them becomes obsolete, and they cannot keep up with changes on the ground. One driver for RSGS is to change this paradigm, by enabling some of the same kinds of services that are provided to other high-value assets, like aircraft, ships, and communication systems.

Today’s satellites are not designed with servicing in mind. So the key RSGS driver is to  provide valuable services even to satellites that have no special modifications for servicing. DARPA technology development has shown that a robotic servicing vehicle can provide at least four servicing missions to unmodified but cooperative customer satellites: ultra-close inspection; assistance with orbit changes; use of robotic manipulation to correct mechanisms (solar arrays, antennas) that have not deployed correctly; and mechanical installation of upgrade or add-on capabilities.

GovSat Report: What challenges is the military currently having that make this program necessary today?

Dr. Roesler: The United States is expected to derive multiple benefits from this GEO satellite servicing capability. Since GEO contains the largest concentration of unserviced high-value assets – many of which perform critical defense and economic roles – it would be of great value to have a reliable and responsive servicing capability available in GEO.

The U.S. Government operates far more satellites in GEO than any other nation. GEO satellites have experienced failures, malfunctions, schedule delays, coverage gaps, unforeseen maneuvers, and other anomalous events.

Because GEO satellites reside on or near a single orbital path, the RSGS servicer would travel among them with little propellant consumption, enabling it to perform many servicing missions before using up its own propellant. The vehicle could provide inspection, repair, upgrade, and repositioning services to Government spacecraft when required, while deriving revenue from servicing commercial spacecraft.

Specific servicing needs that are unavailable today include inspection to determine the cause of on-orbit anomalies; anomaly resolution to repair malfunctioning satellites; orbit modification for relocation, transfer to the disposal orbit, or correction of propulsion system underperformance; and capability enhancement, the transfer of packages with new capabilities and installation on GEO satellites. The RSGS program targets these services for spacecraft currently on orbit or in production, none of which have been specifically designed to be serviced.

GovSat Report: The concept of removing and replacing payloads in space sounds attractive, but is it necessary? During SATELLITE 2016, we heard many speakers discussing software defined payloads and building flexibility into satellites. We’re also seeing the rise of commercial companies with business models tied to extending the life of spacecraft in orbit. What differentiates this program from these services and from the capabilities that are being built into spacecraft today for agility and flexibility?

Dr. Roesler: While uploading new software is a valuable approach for introducing some new capabilities, so is installing upgraded processors, sensors, communication systems and hardware to avoid obsolescence. The same dexterous, flexible robotic payload being developed for RSGS can execute deployment assistance and close inspection, but is also uniquely capable of doing on-orbit installation.

Life extension is a valuable capability, but is not the focus of the RSGS program, which instead emphasizes dexterous robotic capabilities that are not available today.

GovSat Report: How do you anticipate DARPA developing this new technology? Will this be done as a private/public partnership with industry partners, or as a stand-alone military program? Has there been any interest from private industry in partnering on this program?

Dr. Roesler: The end state of the RSGS program is to be a commercially-owned and -operated robotic servicing vehicle (RSV), which carries the Government-furnished robotic payload.

The vehicle will be developed in partnership with a team including the government, a satellite manufacturer, the eventual owner, and the operator. The commercial team will be able to leverage Government contributions, including the development, manufacture, integration and testing of the robotic payload and its advanced automation and payload mission management software; participation in integration of the payload and bus; a launch vehicle to deliver the RSV to GEO or to GEO transfer orbit; and assistance with operations team training and on-orbit operations.

The robotic payload will be designed for multi-year operations. Numerous US aerospace companies have expressed interest.

GovSat Report: What is the timeframe for such an innovative and ambitious program as this? Is this a capability that the military can expect to have available in the next five years? Ten years? Or this something that won’t be realized until well into the future?

Dr. Roesler: DARPA plans to place the RSGS servicing vehicle on orbit in about five years.

For additional coverage from this year’s SATELLITE 2016 Conference, click on the following articles:

Frustration mounts over lack of government hosted payload adoption 

The capacity is coming, the capacity is coming! Why now is the time for COMSATCOM in the federal government 

How government and industry can make hosted payloads happen – an interview with Earl White

The post DARPA Looks to Service Satellites in Space – an Interview with Gordon Roesler appeared first on SES Space and Defense.

By: Mark Wiggins, Director of DoD Business Development, Juniper Networks

Late last month, AFCEA sponsored their annual Technet Asia Pacific Conference, which brings together private industry and leading technology companies with thought leaders and decision makers from the Federal Government and United States Military. It’s the largest event in the Asia Pacific region that focuses on the unique defense issues impacting the region.

I had the opportunity to attend this year’s event in Honolulu, HI, to listen to military leaders describe their challenges and technology requirements in the region, and to discuss these things directly with senior military decision makers. And there was one particular theme that resonated across the entire conference – the need to operate in a communications degraded environment.

When North Korea was first test launching missiles and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were winding down, the Asia PAC theater was the focus of significant military attention. However, that area seemed to be on the back burner in recent months, thanks in large part to the threat of ISIS and other issues in the Middle East.

However, the Asia PAC region remains a priority for the United States military – especially as tensions between NATO and Russia rise, North Korea continues missile testing, and China continues to rapidly construct new islands in the South China Sea.

It’s fair to say that the Asia PAC theater needs the same level of focus – or even more – today than it did previously. And this creates unique challenges for the United States military, especially in the area of communications.

Today’s military relies heavily on the advanced capabilities and intelligence that networks deliver. Bandwidth is essential at the tip of the spear for communications between soldiers in-theater and senior decision makers back at home. It’s also critical for operating drones, sharing data and enabling access to today’s real time intelligence – which is increasingly coming in the form of bandwidth-hogging video.

Unfortunately, getting data to the Asia PAC region is a challenge. Terrestrial networks simply can’t be run since they’d have to physically travel through regions owned and controlled by our adversaries. This leaves the United States military relying on satellite communications – often commercial satellite communications services – for its bandwidth needs.

This situation was eloquently summarized by Randy Bland of COMSATCOM provider, SES Space and Defense, in a recent article on the GovSat Report:

“..establishing the networks that have the available bandwidth for today’s advanced IT capabilities could take years to implement…[and] often require running fiber through nations that aren’t necessarily friendly to the United States and its military interests…It’s for this reason that satellite communication…is becoming as essential to the military as the bandwidth it provides and data it delivers. Commercial SATCOM services carry the signals from unmanned aircraft back to military decision makers. They empower video collaboration between deployed personnel and leaders in the field. They deliver the capabilities, applications and bandwidth that today’s military expects on base – out in the field.”

But getting the data to the region is just one concern. Protecting it from being degraded, compromised or otherwise impacted is another significant challenge – especially considering the adversaries the United States faces in this region. Both China and Russia are sophisticated adversaries with incredible technology at their disposal, making information assurance and security a distressing problem.

First, there’s the issue of jamming or compromising the satellite signal, itself. Luckily, this is something that is becoming a smaller problem thanks to the integration of COMSATCOM into the military satellite environment. Passing signals over COMSATCOM essentially creates deception, since it hides government traffic and data on a satellite that could be carrying other, commercial information. Then, there’s the emergence of High Throughput Satellites (HTS), which utilize “spot beams” that deliver tremendous bandwidth and throughput. These “spot beams” are smaller and more concentrated, which effectively makes the signal harder to jam since perpetrators would need to be physically in the beam’s coverage area.

Once the data and connection is physically in the region thanks to the satellite, it still needs to travel through established terrestrial networks to get to the individuals that need access to the information and bandwidth. And these networks create an additional vulnerability. They can be hacked by malicious actors employed by adversary states, they can be brought down by DDoS attacks, they can even be monitored and compromised thanks to malware.

One of the most interesting technologies receiving a lot of attention wasn’t specifically a security technology, per se. The technology I’m referring to is Software Defined Networking – or SDN. SDN is a new way to build and architecture the networks themselves, where the control and services plane of the network are virtualized. This essentially means that the plane that choreographs the network, understands its structure and defines what services are offered is now software. The virtualization of services also allows more flexibility and agility by eliminating individual “boxes” or pieces of hardware that service one purpose and replacing them with more general pieces of equipment that can be assigned a task or service function.

The end result of moving to a SDN enabled network is more agility. Changes to the network no longer require physical movement and interaction with pieces of hardware. The network is now more flexible and can be changed from one centralized application. This not only decreases downtime by decreasing human error, it allows the military to better respond to the cyberattacks that will invariably be coming from their adversaries.

Imagine a situation where traffic can be routed around devices or parts of the network that have been compromised or brought down by an adversary’s cyberattack. This is the level of flexibility and agility that SDN enables. SDN allows the military to “reshuffle the deck” while not compromising the network, or the services it’s delivering.

The Technet Asia PAC Conference couldn’t have come at a better time. The Asia Pacific theater is once again a major concern and consideration for both the military and the American people as a whole. This region also creates a host of unique and challenging problems when it comes to delivering and securing the data sharing, communications and IT capabilities today’s warfighter expects and relies on in the field. Thankfully, through an increasing reliance on COMSATCOM, advancements in SATCOM technologies, and the emergence of SDN and other security technologies, the military has the tools it needs to better establish and protect network connections in theater than ever before.

This article was originally published on The Modern Network by Mark Wiggins, the Director of DoD Business Development at Juniper Networks. Read the full, original article by clicking HERE.

Feature image courtesy of U.S. Pacific Command.

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